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Abstract
Not all symmetries are on a par. For instance, within Newtonian mechanics, we seem
to have a good grasp on the empirical significance of boosts, by applying it to sub-
systems. This is exemplified by the thought experiment known as Galileo’s ship: the
inertial state of motion of a ship is immaterial to how events unfold in the cabin,
but is registered in the values of relational quantities such as the distance and veloc-
ity of the ship relative to the shore. But the significance of gauge symmetries seems
less clear. For example, can gauge transformations in Yang-Mills theory—taken as
mere descriptive redundancy—exhibit a similar relational empirical significance as
the boosts of Galileo’s ship? This question has been debated in the last fifteen years in
philosophy of physics. I will argue that the answer is ‘yes’, but only for a finite subset
of gauge transformations, and under special conditions. Under those conditions, we
can mathematically identify empirical significance with a failure of supervenience:
the state of the Universe is not uniquely determined by the intrinsic state of its isolated
subsystems. Empirical significance is therefore encoded in those relations between
subsystems that stand apart from their intrinsic states.
Keywords Gauge Theory · Direct empirical significance · Holism · Fields ·
Separability
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview of the debate andmy position within it
In its broadest terms, a symmetry is a transformation of a system which preserves the
values of a relevant (usually large) set of physical quantities. Of course, this broad
idea is made precise in various different ways: for example as a map in the space
of states, or on the set of quantities; and as a map that must respect the system’s
dynamics, e.g. by mapping solutions to solutions or even by preserving the value of
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the Lagrangian functional on the states.
The broad idea is also associated with various debates.1 For example, should we
say that a symmetry transformation applied to the whole universe cannot yield a
different physical state of affairs? And relatedly: should we prefer a reduced i.e.
quotiented formalism, so that if presented with a state space S partitioned into the
orbits of a group of symmetries G acting on S, we prefer the reduced state space
whose elements are the orbits, i.e. [s] ∈ S/ ∼ ? (where s ∼ s′ (s, s′ ∈ S) means that
s and s′ are related by a symmetry transformation: s′ = ξ · s, for ξ ∈ G and · some
action of G on S, and square brackets denote an entire equivalence class).
These “defining features” of symmetries are of central concern for one recent
philosophical debate. More specifically, the debate is about whether gauge sym-
metries can have a direct empirical significance. Of course, all hands agree that
symmetries have various important empirical implications. The obvious examples
come from the Noether theorems: the restrictions on the equations of motion entailed
by Noether’s second theorem, and the (approximately) conserved charges given by
Noether’s first theorem. In other words, symmetries imply the (extraordinary) fact
that charges are conserved.2
But some familiar symmetries of the whole Universe, such as velocity boosts
in classical or relativistic mechanics (Galilean or Lorentz transformations), have
a direct empirical significance when applied solely to subsystems. Thus Galileo’s
famous thought-experiment about the ship—that a process involving some set of
relevant physical quantities in the cabin below decks proceeds in exactly the same
way whether or not the ship is moving uniformly relative to the shore—shows that
sub-system boosts have a direct, albeit relational, empirical significance. For though
the inertial state of motion of the ship is undetectable to experimenters confined to
the cabin, yet the entire system, composed of ship and sea registers the difference
between two such motions, namely in the different relative velocities of the ship to
the water.3
So the question arises: Can other symmetries—especially gauge symmetries—
have a similar direct empirical significance when applied to subsystems?
1See the essays in Brading and Castellani (2003) and the references therein.
2Accordingly, in this debate, such familiar implications are often called the ‘indirect’ empirical signifi-
cance of symmetries (IES); and through them, symmetries carry immense explanatory power.
3As often is the case in physics, the characterization of direct empirical significance used here may rely
on certain approximations. For surely, with the right equipment (such as a window), the person within the
cabin could discern movement of the ship from within, and different movements of the ship could create
different sorts of eddies and turbulence in the sea. This sort of idealization is ubiquitous in physics, and
generally unproblematic. This is echoed in Greaves &Wallace (2014, p. 52, footnote 7): “ ’Dynamical iso-
lation’ is of course approximate in practice, as no proper subsystem can in practice be perfectly isolated. It
is also relative to the observation capabilities of relevant observers (if Galileo had included a GPS tracker
in his list of the cabin’s accoutrements, things would have been rather different).” Nonetheless, approxi-
mate symmetries have consequences for theory construction (cf. Earman (2019) and also Pitts (2011), and
Fletcher (2021) for a formal treatment of approximate symmetries through similarity relations). As a side
note, from now on, I will prefer “sea” to “shore”; this restriction eliminates the need to discuss translations
in addition to boosts (Maudlin, 1993), and places the two subsystems in direct contact, as in the case we
will explore.
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For gauge symmetries are normally taken to encode descriptive redundancy: a
view I will endorse. That is, they arise in a formalism that uses more variables than
there are physical degrees of freedom in the dynamical system described.
This descriptive redundancy means that the natural answer to our question is ‘No’.
For surely, while a “freedom to redescribe” may have some indirect empirical impli-
cations,4 it could not have the content needed for a direct empirical significance,
like the one illustrated by Galileo’s ship. This ‘No’ answer was developed in detail
by Brading and Brown (2004) in response to various discussions such as (Kosso,
2000). They take themselves—I think rightly, in this respect—to be articulating the
traditional or orthodox answer.
The ‘Yes’ answer has been argued for by Greaves and Wallace (2014), build-
ing on Healey (2009). I will agree with some aspects of both Brading and Brown
(2004)’s and Greaves and Wallace (2014)’s analysis of symmetries. But, unlike either
of them, I will recast the topic to focus on gauge-invariant information about—i.e.
states of—regions. My own conclusion will be that only a finite subset of gauge-
transformations, usually called ‘global’ (but here called ‘rigid’, cf. Section 2.2),
can have direct empirical significance, or DES, as it is known in the literature (an
abbreviation I will adopt).
We have glossed the heuristic meaning of DES, and I will provide more precise
definitions in later sections, but an informal sketch is as follows: First, the broad
notion of DES is a matter of the existence of transformations of the universe (or of
the models of the theory) possessing the following two properties (articulated in this
way by Brading and Brown (2004)):
(i) the transformation leads to an empirically different scenario, and
(ii) the transformation is a symmetry of the subsystem in question (e.g. Galileo’s
ship).
If such transformations exist, the symmetries of the theory—related to DES
through (ii)—are said to exhibit DES. The empirical significance is to be witnessed
by observers that lie outside the subsystem—it cannot be detected by those confined
within it. Therefore, DES combines an inside and an outside perspective and, in this
limited sense, acquires an epistemic dimension, or at least one that considers physical
information as it is intrinsically accessible within a subsystem.
Brading and Brown (2004) argue that gauge symmetries cannot exhibit DES
according to (i) and (ii), while Greaves and Wallace (2014) argue that they can. I
myself will argue for a ‘Yes’ answer, but will approach the question in terms of
gauge-invariant information.
By thus proceeding in terms of gauge-invariant information, I will identify DES as
defined by (i) and (ii) above with a particular type of failure of Global Supervenience
on Subsystems (GSS):5 this failure is a form of holism—hence my title.
4 By arriving at a local description to redescribe by weakening the global symmetries of the theory, the
conserved charges implied by the global symmetries are required to couple to fields in such a way that
conservation laws are dynamically respected (this is the content of e.g. the Gauss law).
5 In the context of gauge systems under study here, a failure of global supervenience on subsystems, is
close in spirit to Myrvold’s global patchy non-separability (Myrvold, 2010), which he articulated for the
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I will show that relational DES occurs only when the gauge-invariant global state
fails to supervene on the collection of intrinsic, gauge-invariant local states of the
components of some arbitrary partition (of space or spacetime).
When environment and subsystems are on a par, DES can be rephrased as a mat-
ter of global supervenience. GSS is upheld—indicating the absence of DES—when
the intrinsic physical states of those subsystems composing the whole uniquely deter-
mine the physical state of the whole; the data contained in the intrinsic subsystem
states need not be augmented by relational data in order to uniquely specify the state
of the joined system. When GSS fails—indicating the presence of DES—there can
either be many physical states of the whole which are formed from the same physi-
cal states of the individual subsystems, in which case one is missing some relational
information, or there can be no valid states of the whole, in which case the subsystems
states are incompatible.
Here I should make it clear that I am not claiming ontological priority for the
subsystems composing the whole. Subsystems don’t exist “before” the whole. The
division of the Universe into subsystems is not mandatory, but it appears in item
(ii): so we must consider what physical information is intrinsic to a subsystem when
evaluating the direct empirical significance of symmetries.
It is also important to flag, right at the beginning, a related confusion that perme-
ates the debates on DES: for both DES (direct empirical significance of subsystem
symmetries) and GSS (global supervenience on subsystems) are about the composi-
tion of subsystem into a larger system, not about the decomposition of a larger system
into subsystems. To be clear, in this paper, regarding the less important decomposi-
tion, I will only countenance the case where a given physically allowed state of the
universe decomposes into physically allowed states of its subsystems. I know of no
examples violating this assumption. Therefore, we will focus on the more interest-
ing of the two cases of failure of GSS: namely, the one where, given just the intrinsic
physical states of the subsystems, there are physically distinct possibilities to join
these states into some physical state of the Universe. That is, the relation between
states of the Universe and states of its subsystems are many-to-one, because there
is relevant relational information that cannot be registered intrinsically within each
subsystem. In these cases, we will say there is Global Non-Supervenience on Sub-
systems and denote it by ¬GSS. When ¬GSS prevails, the states of the whole are
not fully encoded in either subsystem: it is encoded in the relations between the two
subsystems.
In certain situations, such as in Galileo’s ship, and, as I will argue, in gauge theory,
there is remarkable order to this variety of physical states of the whole, an order also
encoded in the structure of I . Namely, each element of this variety can be transformed
into another by a subsystem symmetry which does not extend beyond the boundary of
the subsystem. In other words, I carries the structure of finite-dimensional symmetry
group of the subsystem. For Galileo’s ship, these are the Galilean transformations;
holonomy approach to gauge theories. But I refrain from adopting this nomenclature because (i) I do not
focus on holonomies, and (ii) it does not apply to finite-dimensional systems like Galileo’s ship. I will
briefly comment again on this relation in footnote 38 in Section 5.3.
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and for the gauge theory, we will see that they are (sub)groups of the Lie group
characterizing the theory. In this manner, DES becomes a matter of ¬GSS.
In sum, technicalities apart, my main claim is that both Galilean boost sym-
metry for particle systems and gauge symmetry for certain field theories carry
Direct Empirical Significance (DES) through a failure of Global Supervenience
on Subsystems (¬GSS). This holism is empirically significant, since it registers
physical—i.e. gauge-invariant—differences in the entire system and we take such
differences to lead to empirically distinguishable universes. Moreover, the implied
under-determination of the physical state of the whole universe by the physical state
of its subsystems is encoded in a subsystem symmetry, but only as seen from the
‘outside perspective’; again in accord with the above construal of DES.
This last paragraph summarizes my construal of DES in this paper. To flesh it out,
we first need to revisit a different debate in the philosophy of gauge theory, which I
describe in the next section.
1.2 External sophistication
If the standard notion of DES in (i) and (ii) is to be identified with a failure of GSS,
we first need to develop a physically meaningful notion of composition of those
subsystems that possess descriptive redundancy.
This requirement leads us to revisit one other important debate in the philoso-
phy of gauge, already mentioned at the start of the previous section. Namely, given
a theory whose set of universe-descriptions—‘states’—is partitioned by a group of
symmetries, we can take one of two attitudes:
(a)Reduction:– try to write down a reduced theory whose states correspond to the
cells of the partition; or
(b)Sophistication about symmetries6:– resist quotienting the given theory, but
take two symmetry-related states to be isomorphic.
I’ll advocate a third position (c), which applies only in the presence of subsystems.
This position allows reduction for the entire universe, but not for its subsystems. Thus
the position is compatible with the criterion of physical discernibility of the theory
in question: that empirically discerns two different states s1 and s2 of the universe if
and only if [s1] = [s2].
But for subsystems, the question is more subtle, for there are two perspectives we
can take: one from the inside, or intrinsic; and one from the outside, or extrinsic,
6Sophistication has long been advocated for diffeomorphisms and spacetime metrics (see Pooley (2013)
and references therein). The nomenclature was originally used for sophisticated substantivalism: points
of spacetime may have identity, but this identity comes only through the complex web of inter-relations
between different fields of the theory, and is in this way entirely dependent on the state. Some general
features of this position have more recently also been suggested for gauge theories (Dewar, 2017; Gomes,
2019; Caulton, 2015). Dewar describes it thus: “Whereas a reduced theory converts a class of symmetry-
related models into a single model, sophistication converts a class of symmetry-related models into a
class of isomorphic models.” Some philosophers (e.g. Healey 2007, Sec. 4.2 and Maudlin (1998)) have
resisted the analogy between the descriptive redundancy of the metric in gravitational theories and of the
connection in gauge theories. Pace these philosophers, I see no reason for their resistance, but that is a
topic for another day.
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in accord with the definition of DES. If we are interested in discriminating between
(intrinsically) distinct physical possibilities, then surely those states which cannot be
(intrinsically) discriminated are to be counted as one, and so, to that end, ‘reduction’
would still be acceptable.
But, when we combine the subsystem with the rest of the world, we are required to
exploit subsystem symmetries in a real physical sense: as emphasized first by Rovelli
(2014), reduced representations of subsystems cannot be straightforwardly coupled
to each other. For coupling, we need to keep gauge-variant elements in the theory.
In Gomes (2019), it was similarly argued that reduction should only be endorsed
for the entire universe: coupling regional states may require a re-expression of the
states as particular gauge representatives of the physical states;7 and thus, for regions,
gauge-information should not be entirely eliminated.
Therefore, I have argued that we should delineate a third attitude (Gomes, 2019):
(c)No external reduction of subsystem symmetries:–Fix unique representations
of the intrinsic physical states of the subsystems (i.e. from the internal perspec-
tive), but then allow these representations flexibility from an external perspective,
as e.g. required for the smooth coupling of the states of subsystems. Reduction is
a more strict attitude towards symmetries than sophistication, but option (c) should
be construed as permissive: it encompasses an attitude of both internal and external
sophistication, but it cannot encompass one that admits both internal and external
reduction.
Take the example used in Rovelli (2014): a non-relativistic classical system of N
particles with translational invariance. From the intrinsic perspective of the subsys-
tem, one could eliminate redundancy by taking the inter-particle distances as a new,
autonomous set of coordinates, but this would leave no ‘handle’ for other subsys-
tems to couple to. The joint system of autonomous coordinates for two such sets of
particles (say N1 ‘red’ and N2 ‘green’) cannot express different ways of composing
the subsystems—whether the center of mass of the ‘reds’ are five or ten feet away
from the center of mass of the ‘greens’ along some direction does not register in
these variables. From a degree of freedom count, we have clearly gone overboard: we
have eliminated six degrees of freedom of the joint system—the position of the cen-
ter of mass of ‘reds’ (three degrees of freedom) and the position of center of mass of
‘greens’ (three degrees of freedom)—when only three were eliminable: the position
of center of mass of {reds} ∪ { greens}).
On the other hand, fixing the isolated subsystem’s coordinates by reference to its
center of mass, while leaving the center of mass embedded in Euclidean space, still
affords us enough flexibility to characterize both the subsystems intrinsic degrees of
7Rovelli focused on the coupling between different types of fields, or, in the finite-dimensional case, on the
coupling of two different particle systems (Rovelli, 2014). In Gomes (2019) I extended that requirement to
the coupling of fields in regions. See also Dougherty (2017) for a ‘stack-theoretic’ argument emphasizing
the problems of reduction for the coupling of regions: his notion of separability requires the preservation of
gauge-related representations, to be kept as isomorphic but not identified. That is, I construe Dougherty’s
view as a defense of position (b) motivated by the composition of subsystems (but using stack-theory).
Also (implicitly) using a stack-theoretic approach, Nguyen et al. (2018) emphasize that gauge transforma-
tions are not just re-descriptions, but also parameterize the different ways in which regional field spaces
can be composed into global field spaces.
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freedom and a rigid subsystem translation with respect to another subsystem. This is
a very simple example of a “covariant gauge-fixing”, and in practice, it is how we
implement option (c).
In my analysis of DES in the context of holism, the flexibility allowed by option
(c), ‘External sophistication’ for short, is employed for melding the subsystems’
physical content into the physical content of the joint state.8 Option (c) allows us to
have our cake and eat it too: we can both parametrize the intrinsic physical possibili-
ties of the subsystems in a one-to-one manner, and yet keep track of those degrees of
freedom that would be redundant from the intrinsic point of view but which must be
retained, to be pressed into service for composing subsystems (Gomes, 2019).
2 Direct empirical significance
I start, in Section 2.1, by construing DES in terms of properties of transformations
of the Universe. This description of DES immediately runs into some cumbersome
notation when applied to gauge theories. Therefore, in Section 2.2 I introduce a new
terminology which better distinguishes the relevant categories of transformations.
Then, having got the right nomenclature for addressing DES in the context of gauge
theories, in Section 2.3 I apply it to re-express the debate in these better terms. In
Section 2.4, I then proceed to offer an appetizer of my criticism of Brading and
Brown (2004) and Greaves and Wallace (2014)’s construals of DES, and supplant
those construals with my own. Thus here I describe the relation between ¬GSS and
DES.
2.1 DES as a transformation of the universe
Brading and Brown (2004) frame the definition of DES in terms of two conditions.
First, a transformation cannot be a symmetry of the entire universe, otherwise it
would not have any direct empirical significance. But second, it needs to act as a
symmetry for subsystems, otherwise the transformation in question could hardly be
called a symmetry. Thus Brading and Brown define:
Definition 1 (Direct Empirical Significance (DES) as a transformation) A symmetry
has direct empirical significance if it is specified by a transformation that satisfies
the following conditions:9
8Nguyen et al. (2018) accept something like position (c). The main difference is that they don’t impose
a unique representative on regions (they just attach the entire groupoid of fields to each region). In other
words, they are not interested in uniquely and explicitly parametrizing the physical content of each region,
employing instead a “stack-theoretic” picture.
9Both Teh (2016) and Greaves and Wallace (2014) add a condition of dynamical isolation between the
two subsystems. Teh takes this to justify an asymptotic treatment for the subsystem in question. We won’t
need to make this isolation condition explicit: it emerges from the criteria.
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1. Transformation Condition: the transformation must yield an empirically dif-
ferent scenario. In our words: the transformation in question is not a symmetry
of the world as a whole.
2. Subsystem Symmetry Condition: The evolution of the untransformed and
transformed subsystems must be empirically indistinguishable from the interior
point of view. In our words: the transformation should count as a symmetry when
restricted to the subsystems composing the entire system.This is the subsystem
symmetry with DES.10
Thus in the example of Galileo’s ship, the entire system—both ship and sea—is
in different states if the ship is heading through calm waters towards the North-West
at 10km/h or towards the South at 20km/h. The entire system thus satisfies the first
condition (Transformation). Nonetheless, inside the cabin, you would not be able to
distinguish the two scenarios (cf. footnote 3): so the subsystem satisfies the second
condition.
As is clear from the above, the empirical significance cannot be witnessed by
observers within the subsystem and, in that way, DES combines an inside and an
outside perspective: inside it considers intrinsic physical information that is accessi-
ble within the subsystem; outside it considers an overall change in the state of the
universe.
2.2 Two distinctions
At this point in the discussion, standard terminology gets in the way of clarity. When
used in conjunction with subsystem-Universe distinctions, the words ‘local’ and
‘global’ acquire other possible meanings, and may pull intuition in different direc-
tions (see p. 648 of Brading and Brown (2004)). Therefore, it is useful to introduce a
nomenclature that distinguishes these meanings. Therefore I will take the following
to apply to sets of transformations:
10 Although Brading and Brown (2004) distinguish a subsystem and its environment, and thus have only
the singular ‘subsystem’ in their definition, it is customary to focus on relational DES, i.e. DES with the
environment taken on a par with the subsystem in question. Thereby, the environment is taken as just one
more subsystem, and transformations of the environment are to be considered just as much as transforma-
tions of the subsystem. In particular, this demotion of the environment to subsystem status means that one
excludes the exclusively external relations of the environment from its state. A non-relational definition of
DES would not require condition 2 to apply to the environment (cf. footnote 14), that is, it would include
transformations that are not symmetries of the intrinsic state of the environment. The standard argument
against non-relational DES is that only relational DES has a principled connection between a subsys-
tem symmetry and physically distinct universes. To glean the difficulty with non-relational DES, consider
the following example: in the Galilieo ship scenario, imagine a transformation that arbitrarily changes
the configuration of the interior of the beach—taken as part of the environment—but otherwise keeps
the subsystem-intrinsic and all other relational information untouched. If definition 1 did not require the
physical state of the environment to be preserved, such a transformation would be included and therefore
correspond to a symmetry with DES. But an arbitrarily changing beach has little to do with symmetries.
See also footnote 25.
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• Universal: A set of universal transformations has elements that act on the world
as a whole. The set of universal transformations may depend on an infinite or
finite number of parameters.
• Regional: A set of regional transformations has elements that need only apply to
a subsystem of the world.11 The set of regional symmetry transformations may
also depend on an infinite or finite number of paramaters.
• Malleable (aka ‘local’): A set of malleable transformations depends on an infi-
nite number of parameters: e.g. each element is specified by an arbitrary smooth
function over a given manifold or region of a manifold. Here, the usual label is
‘local’. But using ‘local’ invites confusion with the above category, ‘regional’.
I will therefore prefer the term ‘malleable’. A set of malleable symmetry
transformations can be either regional or universal.
• Rigid (aka ‘global’): A set of ‘rigid’ symmetry transformations depends only on
a finite number of parameters. This is to be contrasted with malleable. The usual
label is ‘global’. But again, this term invites confusion, namely with the above
category, ‘universal’. So I will prefer the term ‘rigid’. A set of rigid symmetry
transformations can be either regional or universal.
Therefore a set of symmetry transformations may lie in any of the following four
combinations of the above categories: regional and rigid, regional and malleable, uni-
versal and malleable, or universal and rigid.12 There is a possible inclusion along both
axes of the distinction: a set of rigid transformations can, but need not be, embedded
in a set of larger, malleable transformations; and similarly a set of regional transfor-
mations can be embedded in a set of universal transformations. Here we will label a
given set by the most restrictive combination of categories to which it belongs.
Regional transformations are under-studied in the physics literature, but are known
to hide many surprises: see e.g. Regge and Teitelboim (1974), Balachandran et al.
(1996), Donnelly and Freidel (2016), Gomes et al. (2019), and Gomes (2019). As
to universal transformations, the rigid ones are familiar; they are associated with the
standard treatments of Noether’s first theorem, and thus correspond to conserved
charges (Noether, 1917; Kosmann-Schwarzbach & Schwarzbach, 2011; Brading &
Brown, 2000; Butterfield, 2007). The malleable universal transformations are asso-
ciated to constraints, or relations between the equations of motion (such as the
Hamiltonian constraints or the Bianchi identities of general relativity and the Gauss
constraint in electromagnetism).13
11As in our discussion hitherto, this is often called a ‘subsystem symmetry’ (Greaves & Wallace, 2014;
Teh, 2016), but here I employ this alternative nomenclature because my interest will be solely in
subsystems formed by restricting to a spacetime region.
12Teh (2016) labels the transformations with underlining: as local (meaning regional), and local (meaning
malleable), and global (meaning universal), and global (meaning rigid); but I feel this underlining also
invites confusion.
13In the Hamiltonian treatment, the symmetries are represented as flows in the constrained phase space,
with orbits being the manifold to which the (integrable) flows are tangent. In the Lagrangian treatment,
symmetries are represented as orbits in configuration space (Lee & Wald, 1990). A powerful formalism
which lies in between the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian is the covariant symplectic formalism (Lee &Wald,
1990; Crnkovic & Witten, 1987). It is most useful in discussing canonical (or Hamiltonian) features of a
system while retaining easy access to spacetime covariance.
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2.3 The debate re-expressed
Using this nomenclature, we can re-express Definition 1 and better address the sub-
tleties of applying it to gauge symmetry. Thus Definition 1 says that DES arises if
there are transformations that are not universal symmetries and yet whose restrictions
are regional symmetries. The question is which, if any, regional malleable symmetry
can be obtained in this way, and thus be awarded DES.
Finite-dimensional theories, i.e. ones which do not involve fields, generally only
have rigid symmetries (such as translations, etc.). In those cases, the strictly regional
symmetries can give different values for appropriate physical quantities, viz. rela-
tional quantities relating the transformed subsystem to the rest of the universe. This
is of course what Galileo’s ship illustrates. In this case, the clear distinction between
universal and regional rigid symmetries is illustrated in an uncontroversial case of
DES.
But the situation for malleable symmetries seems different. In certain examples,
the generators of malleable symmetries are spacetime vector fields; in others, they
are Lie-algebra-valued scalar fields, acting on an internal space over each spacetime
point. In any case, it is easy to imagine a malleable symmetry acting on a region
of spacetime and not on another. In this case, the malleable transformation should
smoothly tend to the identity at the boundary between the regions, lest it create
discontinuities in the fields. But then it seems we could suitably extend any such
regional malleable symmetry to the rest of the Universe simply by extending the iden-
tity transformation from the boundary to the rest of the Universe. The conjunction
of the two regional transformations—one that tends to the identity at the boundary
and the other the identity on the rest of the universe—would be a universal (mal-
leable) symmetry, and thus could not have DES, as it would fail to satisfy condition
1—(Transformation)—of Definition 1.
According to Brading and Brown (2004), this is precisely the case:
“Thus, a transformation applied to one subsystem will involve the other subsys-
tem, even if only because the transformation of the gauge field goes smoothly
to the identity. In conclusion, there can be no analogue of the Galilean ship
experiment for local gauge transformations, and therefore local gauge symme-
try has only indirect empirical significance (being a property of the equations
of motion).” (p. 657)
Greaves and Wallace (2014) articulate DES for gauge theory in a manner that
fosters DES for gauge symmetries. They focus on subsystems as given by regions,
and thereby identify transformations possessing properties 1 and 2 of Definition 1 by
first formulating the putative effects of such transformations on the gauge fields in
these regions.
In particular, they focus their attention on relational DES. That means they con-
sider the environment to be on a par with the subsystem in question (cf. footnote 10).
In this case the transformation in Definition 1 must obey property 2—it must also
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be a symmetry of the environment of the subsystem.14 And thus we can diagnose
DES as originating in the relations between the subsystems (and, ultimately, as I will
show, in a failure of supervenience of the global state on the intrinsic states of the
subsystems).
More precisely, for a given subsystem state s, they claim the relational DES trans-
formations are in 1-1 correspondence with the following quotient between two groups
of transformations:
GGWDES(s)  G(s |∂ )/GId, (2.1)
where G(s |∂ ) are the gauge transformations of the region which preserve the state
s at the boundary of the region, and GId are the gauge transformations of the region
which are the identity at the boundary. Here the equivalence class between two trans-
formations ξ, ξ ′ ∈ G(s |∂ ) is taken as ξ ∼ ξ ′ iff ξ ′ = ηξ for some η ∈ GId.15
The rough idea is that even if certain transformations would not preserve all possible
states at the boundary, they will preserve some of those states.16 So, GId is a subgroup
of G(s |∂ ), and one would like to ‘factorize out’ from those transformations those that
would preserve all states at the boundary (i.e. the boundary-identity transformations):
so one defines the quotient group G(s |∂ )/GId.
Several assumptions go into the results of Greaves and Wallace (2014) and Brad-
ing and Brown (2004), and we will challenge some of these once we have described
our own results (see Section 4).
2.4 My own position in the debate: rigid variety
Overall, I will argue for a position not considered by either the Greaves and Wal-
lace (2014) or the Brading and Brown (2004) camp: an appropriate selection of rigid
regional symmetries—but not all the malleable ones!—can retain direct empirical
significance (DES) in both the finite-dimensional case and in the field-theoretic case.
In very specific circumstances, and according to a precise method, the rigid symme-
tries will be identified among the malleable ones—they are the ones that leave the
gauge potential invariant but which shift the matter fields, and they will be the only
14While Greaves and Wallace (2014) do allow for the larger, non-strictly relational quotient group—of all
subsystem symmetries quotiented by the interior ones, where condition 2 need not apply to the environ-
ment, or the complement of the subsystem—they do not investigate this overly general definition of DES.
For, in their nomenclature, there could be no ‘principled connection’ between an element of the wider
group and empirical significance (Greaves & Wallace, 2014, p.86,87). See footnotes 10 and 25 here for
more on the ‘principled connection’ and the treatment of the environment as solely a reference and not a
subsystem; and Ramirez and Teh (2019) for one possible interpretation of the term ‘principled connection’
for non-relational DES.
15A group is just a set closed under an associative invertible binary operation. That is, if ξ, ξ ′ ∈ G, then
ξξ ′ ∈ G, (ξξ ′)ξ ′′ = ξ(ξ ′ξ ′ ′) and for all ξ ∈ G there exists a ξ−1 such that ξ−1ξ =Id, where ξ Id= ξ (here
we will not need to distinguish left and right inverses). The quotient is well-defined for normal subgroups:
namely, G/H is well-defined as a group if given η ∈ H, ξηξ−1 ∈ H for all ξ ∈ G. This holds in the
example above.
16One could think of it as follows: some state s might be ’periodic’ in what it says about the boundary; so
that a transformation with the same period at the boundary will fix the state s at the boundary even though
the transformation is not the identity there (i.e does not fix all states s′ at the boundary. That is: when the
transformation is restricted to boundary, it does not fix each state thus restricted to boundary).
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ones lying in the kernel of a (configuration-dependent, in the non-Abelian case) elliptic
differential operator—and they will be transformations with DES as per Definition 1.
Rigid variety and relational DES In the following, to make matters concrete, the field-
theories I will focus on are general classical Yang-Mills theories in the presence of
matter. The spacetime fields in question will be the standard, smooth gauge poten-
tials, A, and charged scalars, ψ , valued in the appropriate vector spaces, which I
discuss in more detail below, in Section 3.1. I denote the doublet of these two fields
by: ϕ = (A, ψ), and the space of such doublets by   ϕ. The subsystems will
consist of regions in the manifold, to which the fields get restricted. Thus the subsys-
tems in questions are regional, and thus we refer toGlobal Supervenience on Regions
(to avoid unnecessarily detailed acronyms, and since R(egions) are certain types of
S(ubsystems), we will denote these also by the more inclusive GSS). This initial set-
up is standard in the debate about the DES of gauge symmetries, and is applicable to
all of the approaches considered here.
DES combines an inside and an outside perspective: inside it considers physi-
cal information that is intrinsically accessible to subsystems; outside it considers an
overall change in the state of the universe. Definition 1 can be formulated as a failure
of GSS because its requirement 2 is about information that is intrinsically available
to a subsystem. Therefore, for relational DES, a transformation that does not change
the intrinsic physical states of its subsystems and yet changes the physical state of
the Universe must be changing the relations between the subsystems. Therefore, for
DES to exist, there must be a physical variety of universes which are made up from
the same physical states of the subsystems.
Accordingly, within this context of Yang-Mills fields, I define:17
Definition 2 (GSS) Given a manifold , that is decomposed as  = + ∪ −,
where± are bounded manifolds, such that ∂± = +∩− =: S; given a universal
field supported on ϕ and the regional fields, ϕ± supported on ±, GSS holds just
in case the joint gauge-invariant contents of ϕ± is compatible with a unique gauge-
invariant content of ϕ. That is, the doublet of regional physical (i.e. gauge-invariant)
states ([ϕ+], [ϕ−]) uniquely determines a valid physical state [ϕ] for the field over
the entire manifold .
More formally, we label each legitimate/physically possible composition of the
two given regional states to form a physically possible universal state by i, with i
belonging to some index set I , which can depend on the component states.
Thus, I will take failure of GSS to corresponds to the set I having more than
one element.18 We will call this Global Non-Supervenience on Regions, but keep the
17For the relation to Myrvold’s “patchy separability” see footnotes 5 and 38.
18Formally, we could have I = ∅, if the two states are incompatible. As in the more general case of sub-
systems (as opposed to regions), I will not countenance the possibility that the relation between universe
and regional physical states is one-to-many—i.e. that a single universe leaves the state on its constituent
region undetermined—nor that there are valid physical states of the universe whose restrictions to regions
are not themselves physically valid (I can see no plausible scenario in which that occurs).
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label of the more general nomenclature for subsystems (¬GSS). Thus, denoting the
gauge-equivalence class by square brackets, indicating the ith composition of states
by ∪(i) and the resulting universal physical state as [ϕ(i)],19 we write
[ϕ(i)] = [ϕ+] ∪S(i) [ϕ−], i ∈ I with [ϕ(i)] = [ϕ(i′)] iff i = i′ (2.2)
or, in terms of the standard Yang-Mills potential and matter fields:
[(A, ψ)(i)] = [(A+, ψ+)] ∪S(i) [(A−, ψ−)], i ∈ I, (2.3)
So here i is neither a spacetime index nor necessarily related to a Lie-algebra index:
it is just an element of an index set I ([ϕ±])—whose dependence on the given pair
[ϕ±] will be henceforth omitted—and ∪S(i) represents the i-th valid gluing, i.e. com-
position, of the two gauge-invariant data [ϕ±] along S. The global fields ϕ are in
the same class of differentiability as the regional ones (albeit the latter will lie on
manifolds with boundary).
If I is empty there is no possible gluing, i.e. the regional gauge-invariant states
are incompatible and cannot conjoin into a universal physical state (regional incom-
patibility). If I has a single element, the gluing is unique, and then there is GSS. If
otherwise, i.e. if I has more than one element, the universal physical state is undeter-
mined just by the regional physical states: more information about relations between
the subsystems is needed, and there is ¬GSS. In this case, we will also say the
universal state possesses residual variety.
Note that as it stands Definition 2 is in line with both the Galileo’s ship analogy and
with the idea of gauge transformations as mere re-description. Schematically: if the
subsystems are ‘sea’ and ‘ship’, and there are equivalence relations, ∼, applicable to
states of subsystems and of the whole, and given the physical (i.e. “gauge-invariant”)
states [ssea], [sship] and [ssea and ship], there is a many-to-one relation, encoded by the set I :
[s(i)sea and ship] = [ssea] ∪(i) [sship], i ∈ I = Boosts Euclidean, (2.4)
and [s(i)sea and ship] = [s(i
′)
sea and ship] if and only if i = i′. In this case, the set I that parameterizes
the many-to-one relation is the (inhomogeneous) Galilean group (which is a semi-
direct product () of boosts and the group of translations and rotations). The analogy
states that, in general, the physical states [ϕsea] and [ϕship] can be glued in a variety of
ways.
Definition 2 is essentially relational: any variety will be solely a variety of rela-
tions between the subsystems. In the ship case, this variety is classified by Galilean
transformations, i.e. I has a 1-1 correspondence with the Galilean group.
In the following, we will see that there are circumstances in which Yang-Mills
subsystems indeed admit transformations with DES due to ¬GSS in this full sense.
Namely, for certain regional gauge-invariant data which can be glued together i.e.
composed to give a physically possible universal state, there may remain a residual
19Even though each i will represent a different physical state, we avoid putting the subscript outside of the
equivalence class, because there is only one equivalence class of ϕ; it can have no indexing.
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variety of universal gauge-invariant data obtained from this gluing. This variety is
parametrized by rigid transformations, not malleable transformations, and is encoded
by the external action of a finite-dimensional Lie group on a subsystem. In some cir-
cumstances this group will act regionally in each subsystem, but in others, the group
and its action only have a natural interpretation intrinsic to the boundary between
the regions. In the latter case, that can only occur in the presence of malleable sym-
metries, I will argue that ¬GSS does not have a natural interpretation in terms of
DES.
To sum up, in some cases there is a ‘regional rigid symmetries’-worth of universal
states which are regionally gauge-equivalent to each other but have a relational phys-
ical distinctness, i.e. are physically distinct (not universally gauge-equivalent) due to
relational differences. The particular structure of I will be that of a rigid subgroup
of the set of gauge transformations, but it will depend on the regional field content
in each case. It is the field content which identifies the rigid subgroups of the full
infinite-dimensional malleable group that have DES.
In Yang-Mills theory,¬GSS is associated with DES only in conjunction with those
conditions which are necessary for the existence of conserved global charges, as
related to the rigid subgroup I .20 This procedure thus establishes a link between what
is known as an indirect consequence of gauge—the conservation of charges—and a
‘direct’ one (DES).
3 When global supervenience fails: finding¬GSS
In this section I will explore the definition of DES as under-determination of universal
gauge-invariant data from regional gauge-invariant data. That is, I will explore DES
according to a failure of global supervenience on subsystems (¬GSS) as described
in Definition 2. I will illustrate this for Abelian gauge theories (i.e. electromagnetism
with a scalar field).21 For this simple case, I will explicitly show that the whole state
is underdetermined by the regional states, and that the ensuing variety of universal
20Namely, the association will obtain only for reducible configurations—those which have stabilizing
gauge transformation (analogous to non-trivial Killing fields for a spacetime metric)—in which case I is
the group of reducibility parameters (analogous to the isometry group of a spacetime metric) (Barnich &
Brandt, 2002).
21 I will only discuss the non-Abelian case in the Appendix. In that case, two concessions must be made:
1) due to the non-linear character of the theory, gluing takes place at the perturbative level, and so we
must specify which underlying configuration is to suffer the perturbations. (So the index set I would
have to be written as I ([ϕ±]) as envisaged just after Eq. 2.3). Nonetheless, the formalism transforms
covariantly with respect to gauge transformations of the perturbed configuration and one is able to retain,
for the non-Abelian context, all the interesting results obtained in this Section. This sounds like the BRST
treatment of gauge theories (see Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992) for a review), by which one retains
global transformations even if one eliminates the degeneracy in the propagator of the theory through a
perturbative gauge-fixing. And indeed, the tools used in this work in the non-Abelian context recover the
properties of BRST ghosts; see Gomes and Riello (2017) and o(Gomes et al., 2019, Sec 3.1) for more on
this recovery. 2) Only in the non-Abelian case is there a possibility to have boundary stabilizers of the
gauge potential that do not extend into the bulk of the regions. Thus I will leave to Appendix A.3.2 further
discussion about why the physical variety associated to these stabilizers should not be taken to have DES.
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states is equivalent to a copy of (i.e. is parametrized by) the charge group (U(1)). I
will thus prove my main claim that there is a regional (or subsystem) rigid group of
symmetries with (relational) DES, emerging from residual variety, as per Definition
2.
I will organize this section as follows. Section 3.1 will introduce the necessary
notation. Section 3.2 sets up the remaining tools for the procedure, giving an intro-
duction to our use of gauge-fixing and gluing. In Section 3.3 I describe precisely how
‘external sophistication’ is deployed to facilitate the gluing of the regional physical
states. In that section, I vindicate my main claims on the connection between super-
venience and relational DES: viz, that there is a rigid group of regional symmetries
parametrizing by the residual variety of universal physical states which are composed
by identical regional physical states.
3.1 General notation
We are given a manifold , which for our illustrative purposes in this Subsection will
represent a space(time) endowed with an Euclidean metric.22 I will also assume  is
closed, that is, compact and without boundary. Given a charge groupG, i.e. the finite-
dimensional Lie-group characterizing the theory, the group of gauge transformations
is G = C∞(, G). The gauge field A and its gauge-transformed Ag are given by
Lie-algebra valued space(time) 1-forms.
In the main text of the paper, I will only consider the simpler case of Maxwell
electrodynamics coupled to scalar Klein-Gordon theory. Thus, for the Abelian case,
the structure, or charge, group is G = U(1) and we write
Ag = A + igrad(g) and ψg = exp(ig)ψ . (3.1)
Here A ∈ C∞(T ∗,R) and g ∈ C∞(,R) = C∞(,Lie(G)) =: Lie(G),
an infinitesimal gauge transformation. More generally, A would be a smooth Lie-
algebra valued 1-form on , but here the Lie-algebra is u(1)  R. For our context
and purposes—finding ¬GSS in the Abelian case—the distinction between the Lie-
algebra and the Lie-group is unimportant, and so I will work with the Lie-algebra u(1)
as opposed to the group U(1).23 The non-Abelian case is treated in the Appendix.
I will also assume that the manifold  is endowed with a Riemannian metric, gij ,
and that it is decomposed into two regions (cf. Fig. 1): ±, with boundary ∂± =:
S = + ∩ −.
The − piece is what is usually labeled ‘the environment’, but here will play the
role of another subsystem (as for relational DES; cf. footnote 10). For now, each of
22The Euclidean metric provides a simpler interpretation of the results on gluing, in the next section. See
Gomes and Riello (2019) for more on this topic, and for how one can import the relevant results to the
Lorentzian signature, “3+1” context. In any case, the philosophy of physics literature on DES ignores the
contrast between Euclidean and Lorentzian signatures.
23In the Abelian case we will be mostly concerned with, the relation between the Lie algebra element
g ∈ u(1) and the group element, ξ ∈ G, is: g = −i ln ξ , or ξ = exp(ig). This translation can be applied
at any point in the following computations. Using the Lie-algebra rather than group is useful in translating
our results to the non-Abelian case, since there we cannot work directly with the group.
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Fig. 1 The two spacetime regions ±, separated by a manifold with codimension one, S. Here  is R2,
the plane on which the figure is drawn
, ± is assumed topologically trivial; and, if any of these manifolds is not compact,
then all the fields on them will be restricted to have some suitably fast fall-off rate.24
I will denote the regional, unquotiented configuration spaces of each field sec-
tor (gauge field A, matter field ψ , and doublet (gauge and matter fields) ϕ) as A±,
	± and ± (respectively). I will omit the subscript ± for the corresponding univer-
sal configuration spaces (i.e. A, 	, , respectively). The restricted groups of gauge
transformations (i.e. smooth maps from regions of the manifold into G) will be
denoted in analogous fashion: G± = C∞(±, G), and all abstract quotient spaces
are denoted by square brackets, as in [±] := ±/G±, and [] := /G.









− are the characteristic functions of the regions + and − i.e. they
are distributions: unity in the region, and zero outside, with some conventional value
at the boundary which is immaterial for our purposes. Smoothness requires equality
of the following quantities at S: (∂nA+) |S = (∂nA−) |S and mutatis mutandis for
ψ in place of A; where the superscript n denotes all derivatives: first order, second
order, i.e. n = 1, 2, etc.; and for any combination of independent directions, i.e.
x, y, z parametrizing . We will understand all equalities at S, written for simplicity
like A+ |S = A− |S , to be such an equality.
24In Figure 1, one could think of − as a collar around +; this would not block our treatment. The
only complication would be to then consider further boundary conditions on −, and so on. We there-
fore restrict our attention to the case where − encompasses the “rest of the universe”, i.e. the entire
“environment” in the language of Greaves and Wallace (2014).
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3.2 DES as¬GSS: set-up
At first sight, the question we face in this Section is much simpler than the previous
literature’s construals of DES: how do we make sense of the equation (cf. Eq. 2.2):
[ϕ(i)] = [ϕ+] ∪S(i) [ϕ−], i ∈ I ? (3.3)
But there are two related obstacles.
First, the elements of [A], being orbits of the gauge field spaceA under the action
of G, are not directly parametrizable. Second, the only criterion for gluing quo-
tients employs representatives, i.e. elements of A. That is, there is no composition of
physical states that is not formulated in terms of the composition of representatives.
The first step in overcoming these issues is to “gauge-fix”: that is, to select a class
of elements of A which uniquely represent elements of [A] (cf. (Gomes, 2019 Sec.
2)). A selective class fixes further conditions which the representatives must satisfy.
The second step will consist in exploiting external sophistication, as advocated in
Section 1.2.
Given [A±] ∈ [A±], for any two representativesA± ∈ A of [A±], the condition of
composition—the conditition that must be satisfied by a pair of fieldsA± in order that
they can be composed into a single field on the whole region—can then be translated
into the following gluing condition: there exist gauge transformations, g± ∈ G±, such
that the gauge-transformed representatives smoothly join (cf. Eq. 3.1):
A
g++ |S = Ag−− |S ⇒ (A+ − A−)|S = grad(g+ − g−)|S . (3.4)
If there are also matter fields that are non-zero on S, the corresponding relation to
Eq. 3.4 is:
ψ
g++ |S = ψg−− |S ⇒ exp(ig+)ψ+ |S = exp(ig−)ψ− |S . (3.5)
To ensure that we retain the full physical content of the regional states and the
capacity to relate arbitrary configurations, there must be no prior restrictions on the
gauge transformations at the boundary.25 This is crucial, both conceptually—why
should the “redundant descriptive fluff” at the boundary be any different than in the
bulk?—as well as technically. Our focus on gauge-invariant quantities thus allows a
pure gauge discontinuity at the boundary.
In other words, from the perspective of the subsystem-instrinsic information—
as in condition 2 of Definition 1—the only criteria for the composition of regional
representatives is whether under some appropriate regional gauge transformations the
resulting doublets of regional representatives smoothly compose.
25While such a truncation is standard in the literature concerning gauge theory in asymptotic regions (cf.
Regge and Teitelboim (1974), Balachandran et al. (1996), Giulini (1995), and Strominger (2018)), in that
context there are no subsystems that should be glued back together, and the environment is not on a par
with the subsystem. See Gomes (2020) for a treatment of finite regions with such an assumption, there
called ‘the externalist notion of boundary’ and Riello (2019) for a recovery of the asymptotic results,
including the so-called soft charges, using the present framework.
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3.3 Reduction, sophistication, and gluing
This is the most important technical Section of the paper, in which I illustrate the
conceptual tools developed so far. In Section 3.3.1, I will show how one reduces,
or fixes a selective class of representatives for the gauge fields, through a gauge-
fixing.26 In Section 3.3.2 I will describe how external sophistication is important for
gluing. And finally, in Section 3.3.3 I describe the residual physical variety.
3.3.1 The projection h introduced
Given the regions ±, we will consider two states, ϕ± = (A±, ψ±). We need to
uniquely characterize the physical content of such states.
Let us first focus on the gauge-fields, A±. We will return to the matter fields
in Section 3.3.3. Thus we must fix unique representatives of A±, through a projec-
tion:27
h± : A± → A±
A± → h±[A±] =: h±A (3.6)
where h±A will uniquely represent (i.e. is in the image of all elements of) the
equivalence class [A±].
But we must maintain our ability to describe the possible gluing of the h±A through
an analogue of Eq. 3.4. Thus h±A can be gauge-invariant intrinsically—allowing inter-
nal reduction—while still allowing gauge transformations to act, “extrinsically”, on
them—enforcing external sophistication. That is, in the following, we can endorse
‘reduction’ (cf. Section 1.2) for determining the regional and universal physical con-
tent. But, to describe gluing, it is mandatory to endorse ‘external sophistication’: i.e.
allowing all the different representations of the same regional physical content to be
counted as isomorphic but not identified from the outside view.
Technically, these demands imply we should look for a projection h± : A± →
A±, as opposed to a reduction, red± : A± → [A±]. In Gomes (2019) and Gomes
(2020) the construal of a gauge-fixing as a projection h, and not as a quotient, was
argued to be fundamental for the gluing of regions: for both h± and red± are required
to be gauge-invariant with respect to gauge-transformations on the common domain,
A±, i.e. red±(Ag) = red±(A) as well as h±(Ag) = h±(A), but only the projection
h± allows further transformations to be enacted on its range.
In order to establish a direct correspondence between regional and universal phys-
ical states, we need to find unique representatives first at the regional level, glue, and
26In the Abelian case, the covariance property under transformations of the perturbed configuration need
not be flagged explicitly, cf. footnote 27 below.
27Here h stands for horizontal. Although we will not need to introduce the entire field-space principal
fiber bundle formalism here (Gomes & Riello, 2019), this is where ‘horizontal’ comes from: horizontal
directions are essentially a choice of non-gauge directions in field space transforming covariantly along
the fiber. The word ‘horizontal’ is more appropriate in the non-Abelian case: in the Abelian, horizontal
directions are integrable, and correspond rather to a (covariant) foliation of the field-space A, i.e. to a
G-covariant family of gauge-fixings.
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then find unique representatives of the universal state. That is, even once we have
established unique representatives of the regional physical state, there are many ways
of gluing (as we will see in Section 3.3.2 below), and this plethora will give rise to
many possible universal representatives of the state. But ¬GSS refers to the universal
physical state as well as to the regional physical states. Thus, after gluing, we need to
resolve the mapping between regional and universal physical states, and so we need
to determine which universal physical states are formed from the gluing of which
regional physical states. That is, we need to eliminate the plethora of possible extrin-
sic gauge transformations—that provide a redundant representation of the universal
physical state—as well as the intrinsic ones, that provide a redundant representation
of the regional physical states.
To discern the possible universal physical states, we apply the corresponding
gauge fixing for closed—compact without boundary—regions. In the absence of
boundaries, i.e. for the universal representative state A, instead of Eq. 3.6 we have:
h : A → A
A → h[A] =: hA. (3.7)
Let us add some detail to this procedure.
3.3.2 Internal reduction and external sophistication: option (c) realized.
First, without loss of generality, we can find linear projections h± : A± → A± such
that their images satisfy: {
div(h±A) = 0
s · h±A = 0
(3.8)
where s is the normal to the boundary S, and · is induced by the inner product on. It
might seem surprising that we can restrict our attention to such constrained boundary
conditions on A± and yet still encompass the entire gamut of possible regional phys-
ical states. The reason for this is that any other state—including ones with boundary
behavior different from Eq. 3.6—differs from such a h±A by a unique regional gauge
transformation; again, a regional gauge transformation that is possibly non-trivial at
the boundary. Thus we define the unique regional physical representatives through
the projection corresponding to Eq. 3.8:
[A±] ≡ h±A := A± + igrad(σ±[A±]). (3.9)
where we denoted the relation of being 1-1, or being uniquely represented by, or
being equivalent to, by ≡.
Here the σ± act as subsystem-intrinsic gauge transformations. More specifically,
given h± : A± → A±, where domain and range are seen as distinct, but isomorphic,
spaces, a subsystem-intrinsic gauge-transformation is just a gauge-transformation
acting on the domain of h. It maps between members of the same equivalence class.
Here σ±[A±] is a subsystem-intrinsic gauge transformation that takes any A± to its
unique representative satisfying Eq. 3.8: σ± enacts the projection operation.
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The label ‘intrinsic’ stands in opposition to ‘extrinsic’. Intrinsic gauge transforma-
tions are all that is needed for a unique description of the entire Universe, since there
is nothing external to the entire Universe.
Therefore we can now distinguish two sorts of action of G: a subsystem-intrinsic
action and a subsystem-extrinsic one. Subsystem-intrinsic transformations will map
between the members of the same equivalence class, whereas the extrinsic ones act
as transformations between the representatives of these equivalence classes.28
But if we have more than one subsystem and we want to satisfy the gluing con-
dition Eq. 3.4, we may need to change the representative of the equivalence class
[A±]—from the outside, as it were.
For that, we need to define subsystem-extrinsic gauge transformations gext, as
those transformations which act on the range of h as
h±A → h±A + i grad(gext± ). (3.10)
Of course such a transformed field need no longer satisfy Eq. 3.8.
That is, subsystem-intrinsic gauge transformations are defined as those acting
on the field configurations in the domain of the projection, whereas the subsystem
extrinsic act on its range. Once we have eliminated redundancy and fixed a 1-1 corre-
spondence with [A±], the image of h±, i.e. h±[A±] ⊂ A±, is invariant with respect
to gauge transformations acting on its domain, but we can still change representatives
by acting on its range, A±.
Gluing We are given the physical content of the regional configurations as (in terms
of) their projected representatives h±A , and while these representatives h
±
A might not
smoothly join, they may still jointly correspond to a physically possible universal
state. The existence of subsystem-extrinsic gauge transformations smoothening out
the transition between h+A and h
−
A is a necessary and sufficient condition for their
compatibility.
That is, the h±A determine whether they can be smoothly joined by subsystem-
extrinsic gauge transformations. Following Eq. 3.4, the condition is that subsystem-
extrinsic gauge transformations gext± exist such that (in spacetime index-free nota-
tion29):
(h+A − h−A)|S = igrad(gext+ − gext− )|S; (3.11)
which is the appropriate rewriting of the gluing condition Eq. 3.4.
However, as mentioned, this is not enough to establish a direct correspondece
between universal and (the doublet of) regional physical states: although we have the
28 It is instructive to compare the two possibilities of action of G to the use of homotopy type theory
(HoTT) in gauge theory, as advocated by Ladyman (2015). Ladyman says HoTT “both (a) distinguishes
states conceived of differently even if they are subsequently identified, and (b) distinguishes the identity
map from non-trivial transformations that nonetheless might be regarded as delivering an identical state”.
Here we have two sorts of transformations: the subsystem-intrinsic one, A → Ag , which does not change
h[A]—satisfying Ladyman’s (b)—, and the subsystem-extrinsic one, that does the work of Ladyman’s (a).
29Using indices, the equation is: (hμ+ − hμ−)|S = i∂μ(gext+ − gext− )|S .
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physical representatives on the regional side, we do not yet have them on the universal
side of the correspondence.
3.3.3 Establishing the main claims
Finally, we must know which of these gluings give rise to physically distinct uni-
versal configurations. Thus, we need to successively eliminate the redundancy of
subsystem-intrinsic and extrinsic gauge transformations and get a unique representa-
tive of the regional and glued universal state.
To add details to the previous considerations: at the universal level, Eq. 3.8 reduces
to the familiar statement that the condition
div(hA) = 0. (3.12)
This is a bona-fide (partial) gauge condition, called the (Euclidean) Lorentz gauge,
or, in the non-Abelian setting, the (perturbative) covariant Landau gauge. It is ‘par-
tial’ because a different choice, related to h by a constant shift, would still satisfy
Eq. 3.12. It implies that the representative of the universal physical state is only
determined up to a global phase shift. This will be important in what is to come. It
is also important to notice that the particular choice of gauge is immaterial for the
forthcoming theorems (cf. (Gomes & Riello, 2019, Sec.6.1.2)).
We know that each h and h± yields a unique element in each orbit because of
the way the projection h : A → A works by exploiting gauge transformations. For
instance, in the universal case, for U(1):
h[A] := A + i grad(i∇−2(div(A))) = Aσ [A], (3.13)
where ∇−2 is the inverse operator to the Laplacian (a Green’s function),30 and the
functional
σ [A] := i∇−2(div(A)) (3.14)
is the unique solution of the equation:
div(h[A]) = div(Aσ [A]) = 0. (3.15)
Moreover, it is easy to see from Eq. 3.13 that the h[A] satisfies h[Ag] = h[A],
∀g ∈ G. Thus h is a complete, gauge-invariant functional, uniquely representing each
equivalence class; we have one, and only one hA := h[A] per orbit of the gauge
group. And a similar σ±, with analogous properties, exists for for h± obeying the
regional (3.8).
Putting it all together: we start being given the regional physical states, by Eq. 3.9,
which we just denote by h±A . These are the original A± adjusted by the subsystem-
intrinsic gauge transformations σ± enacting the projections onto the constraint
surface. Now we allow extrinsic gauge transformations to act on the range of h±, as
in Eq. 3.10, i.e. h±A → h±A + i grad(gext± ). We then form a glued state:
hA := (h++A igrad(gext+ ))
+ + (h−A + igrad(gext− ))
− (3.16)
30This is usually written, in the theory of differential operators on distributions, through a bi-local operator
∇−2 := G(x, y), i.e. a Green’s function, so that ∫ G(x, y)∇2F(x) = F(y).
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by requiring that gext± obey Eq. 3.11, and hA obeys Eq. 3.12, and thus uniquely rep-
resents the physical state, i.e. demanding that div(hA) = 0 (we assume the universe
has no boundary).
Imposition of these conditions on Eq. 3.16 almost uniquely fixes gext± [(h+A −
h−A)|S].31 In the U(1) case, there is an under-determination by a constant extrinsic
gauge transformation in each region; let us call this indeterminacy (c+, c−). Thus
gext± [h+A, h−A] is fixed up to the addition of constants, c± ∈ R. We note that as
expressed, this is an indeterminacy at the level of the Lie-algebra; for the Lie-group,
we would get exp(ic±) ∈ [0, 2π ].
The hard work is now behind us. But to finally get to the main claims of the paper,
we must still include charged matter fields in our description.
Charged matter fields First, note that the discussion so far focused on the gauge
fields, A. But including matter fields is not difficult, since matter fields ‘co-rotate’
with A± under gauge-transformation. That is, since both the gauge and matter fields
are subject to the same gauge transformations (you cannot consistently apply one
gauge-transformation for A and another for the matter field ψ), the gauge representa-
tive of matter fields just get “taken for the ride” by the fixing of σ [A]. That is, when
the gauge transformations projecting onto the gauge-fixing surface, σ±, are unique,
a given doublet, ϕ± = (A±, ψ±) is also projected to a unique representative:
(h±A, h
±
ψ) := (A± + igrad(σ±[A±]), exp (iσ±[A±]ψ±), (3.17)
In the asymptotic flat case, the universal functional exp (iσ [A])ψ is known as the
“Dirac dressed electron” (Dirac, 1955). It is an electron that is “dressed” by an appro-
priate Coulombic tail, rendering the electron also gauge-invariant (as can be easily
checked from the gauge-covariant transformation properties of σ ). The function h±
is known as the “radiative” projection of the photon. Here we have extended both
notions to finite bounded regions (see Gomes et al. (2019) and Gomes and Riello
(2019)).
Since we find unique representatives for the full regional physical field con-
tent, we can identify (using the notation‘≡’) the physical content with its unique
representative:
[ϕ±] ≡ (h±A, h±ψ), (3.18)
and take these as the starting point for gluing.
31 In both Abelian and non-Abelian case, gext± depends on h±A only through their difference at the boundary:
(h+A − h−A)S (in the non-Abelian case, each gext depends also on its respective regional gauge field, e.g.
gext+ [A+, (h+A − h−A)|S ]). For illustration purposes, I display the solution here:







where the subscript S denotes operators and quantities intrinsic (i.e. pulled-back) to the boundary surface
S (and since normal components of h±A match, (h
+
A − h−A)|S = (h+A − h−A)S ); ζ u(±) is a harmonic function
on (respectively) ± with Neumann boundary condition ∂nζ u(±) = u, and R is the Dirichlet-to-Neumann
operator. For the meaning of these operators, and also the analogous solution for the general non-Abelian
Yang-Mills gauge theories, see (Gomes & Riello, 2019, Sec. 6).
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Inputting Eq. 3.18 into the universal state Eq. 3.16 and solving for Eq. 3.12, we




ext+ )), exp i(gext+ + c+)h+ψ
)

+ + (+ ↔ −) (3.19)
where the term (+ ↔ −) is identical to the first, mutatis mutandis for − replacing
+, and I have omitted the dependence of gext± on h±A . The important point to under-
stand is that, although the degenaracy in gluing, c±, has no effect on the gauge field,
it will add a phase, or rotate, the matter part.
But now we must consider two cases: either the ψ± vanish at S, or they don’t.
Assume first that ψ± vanish at S. We then have no further constraints and thereby
obtain a 2-parameter family of universal states, Eq. 3.19, parametrized by exp(ic±).
In other words, given regional physical states [ϕ±], here a conjunction of e.g. a trans-
verse projection of the photons and a Dirac dressing of the charges, we can glue them
to form a two-parameter collection of universal states.
Naively, this would give us two copies of U(1), parametrizing the universal phys-
ical states that are compatible with the regional physical contents. But of course,
if c+ = c−, we have a global constant phase shift (which precisely matches
the expected left-over under-determination of the universal physical state [ϕ] by
Eq. 3.12) which does not change the universal physical state. Therefore, we are left
with a residual physical variety parametrized by the difference, c := c+ − c−, which
is insensitive to any global phase shift. To sum up, if the matter fields vanish at the
boundary, we obtain a residual variety that is isomorphic to a single copy of U(1) and
in fact can be identified with relative, regional, rigid phase shifts.
Assume now thatψ± do not vanish at S. Then not every boundary value is allowed:
the two sides must differ by a phase at the boundary, and this phase difference needs
to match the gauge transformation required to glue the gauge potentials. That is, by
Eq. 3.5,
exp i((gext+ + σ+) − (gext− + σ−) + (c+ − c−))ψ+ |S = ψ− |S (3.20)
where (gext+ + σ+) − (− ↔ +) is a fixed functional of the gauge fields, and c±,
which were entirely under-determined previously by the gauge fields A, will now
completely fix the quantity (c+ − c−) by Eq. 3.20. Thus, if the matter fields do not
vanish at the boundary (and are compatible with each other and with the gauge fields,
satisfying (3.20), there is no variety left, since the compatibility (3.20) completely
fixes the difference c.
Finally, as a corollary of these constructions, we are able to state our main result
of this Section for gluing physical states:
Theorem 1 (Rigid variety for U(1)) For electromagnetism as coupled to a Klein-
Gordon scalar field in a simply-connected universe: given the physical content of two
regions, [ϕ±], for matter vanishing at the boundary but not in the bulk of the regions,
the universal state is underdetermined, resulting in a residual variety parametrized
by an element of U(1). In the notation of Eq. 2.2 and Definition 2:
[ϕ(i)] = [ϕ+] ∪S(i) [ϕ−], i ∈ I  U(1) (3.21)
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where the particular action of U(1) is that which leaves the gauge-fields invariant,
but not the matter fields.32
Thus we have found, in the case of electromagnetism coupled to a scalar field, a
rigid variety through ¬GSS, as per Definition 2 in Section 2.4. Moreover, by fixing a
reference subsystem (−), we can construe this U(1) as acting as a group of (rigid),
regional symmetries over +, that shift the phase of matter but do not affect the
gauge potentials (as in the ‘t Hooft beam-splitter,33 (’T Hooft, 1980)). That is, we
have constant phase shifts.
In direct analogy with Galileo’s ship—where we also recognize ¬GSS as encoded
by the (external) action of a finite-dimensional group—we have fully vindicated our
main claims: namely, that ¬GSS is a source of empirically significant subsystem
symmetries.
Agreed, the non-Abelian Yang-Mills case is more complicated: non-linearities
render the corresponding I of the equation corresponding to Eq. 3.21 dependent on
the physical state. Nonetheless, our constructions are valid at a perturbative level, i.e.
one needs to first fix a ground state and then perturb it. If the perturbed state is the
‘vacuum’, i.e. [A∗] for A∗ = 0, then we recover the full Lie algebra of the gauge
group through the analogue of Eq. 3.21. In that case too, the particular rigid sub-
group is identified as the one that leaves the perturbations invariant but not the matter
sources.
4 Comparison with Greaves &Wallace and Brading & Brown
Now that our work is done, I will draw several lines of comparison to the approaches
of Brading and Brown (2004) and Greaves and Wallace (2014). Their positions were
introduced briefly in Section 2.3 in sparse detail, but we will not need more than that.
In Section 4.1 I briefly gloss (Brading & Brown, 2004)’s argument against DES; it
relies on an a priori condition on the possible doublet of regional gauge transforma-
tions: that they smoothly join. In Section 4.2, I briefly gloss (Greaves & Wallace,
2014)’s arguments for DES. In Section 4.4, I will show, contra (Greaves & Wallace,
2014), that the lack of DES for general malleable symmetries still allows for the
context-dependent identification of some of their rigid subgroups—which do have
DES.
4.1 Brading and Brown: regional gauge transformations must match
As the quotation at the end of Section 2.3 illustrates, (Brading & Brown, 2004)
take any two regional gauge transformations which fail to coincide at their common
32In this phrasing, the variety is more widely applicable, e.g. to non-Abelian fields. For the Abelian case,
it just means we take the group of constant phase shifts.
33This is a beam-splitter with two arms (containing electron fields)—the equivalent of our regions—
and the phases are individually shifted by a constant in each arm. This phase difference can alter the
interference pattern, and thus, it serves as an example of a subsystem gauge transformation with DES.
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boundary to be disallowed. In discussing the t’Hooft beam splitter (cf. footnote 33),
they conclude:
“The only remaining option is to consider a region where the wavefunction
can be decomposed into two spatially separated components, and then to apply
local gauge transformation to one region (i.e. to the component of wavefunction
in that region, along with the electromagnetic potential in the region) and not
to the other. But then either the transformation of the electromagnetic potential
results in the potential being discontinuous at the boundary between the ‘two
subsystems’, in which case the relative phase relations of the two components
are undefined (it is meaningless to ask what the relative phase relations are), or
the electromagnetic potential remains continuous, in which case what we have
is a special case of a local gauge transformation on the entire system.” (p. 656)
Brading and Brown (2004) are right in one respect: once you have a universal con-
figuration one can not apply gauge transformations which are discontinuous (e.g.
produce a delta function) at the interface.34 On the other hand, it is also true that one
could have regional configurations being acted upon by regional gauge transforma-
tions which don’t match at the boundary.35 In this second instance, one aims to take
the regional subsystem intrinsically and have non-matching gauge transformations
applied to them before gluing; it reflects our emphasis on composition as opposed to
decomposition, as described in Section 1.1.
In other words, in their quotation, Brading and Brown (2004) ignore the fact that
the formulation of DES, through property 2 of Definition 1, requires only informa-
tion intrinsic to a subsystem—which is why we related it to supervenience of the
universe on its subsystems. All hands agree that, from the viewpoint of the universe
one cannot have a gauge transformation which is discontinuous at the boundary.
From this viewpoint it is true that g+ = g |+ and g− = g |− ; i.e. that the regional
gauge transformations are mere restrictions of a universal gauge transformation.
And their inference is flawless: such an assumption would pre-empt any search for
DES.
But the assumption is flawed. For the topic of supervenience, one starts from the
regional states and then composes them. From this perspective, it is the effect of the
regional gauge transformations that matter.
Greaves and Wallace (2014) spot this error, and assert that what should be funda-
mental is only the continuity of the glued gauge and matter fields, A, ψ , not of phase
shifts. In their words (but my notation) (p. 83):
The key to seeing why this argument fails is noting that what is given, when
we are given the pre and post-transformed states of the universe, is not a func-
tion from spacetime to the gauge group, but merely the effect of whatever
transformation is being performed on the particular pre-transformation (uni-
verse) state (ψ, A). And if this particular ψ happens to vanish on the overlap
34See p.79 and 82 Greaves and Wallace (2014) for their endorsement of continuity of universal gauge
transformations.
35See p. 83 of Greaves and Wallace (2014) for their endorsement of this point.
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region [the boundary S], then nothing about the corresponding gauge transfor-
mations g+, g− can be ’read off’ from their effects on the wavefunction in that
region [assuming they are constant near S]. It is therefore possible that the uni-
verse transformation being performed might correspond to the effect of (say)
some constant gauge transformation g+ in +, and a different constant gauge
transformation g− in −, so that there is no way of patching g+, g− together
to obtain a single smooth function from the whole of spacetime to the gauge
group. [my italics]
I fully agree with this verdict, as far as it goes. It means one considers the effect of the
regional g± on the subsystems from the intrinsic point of view. One does not take g±
as the regional restrictions of a discontinuous g. But I believe Greaves and Wallace
(2014) do not consistently apply composition throughout their procedure, as we will
shortly see.
Nonetheless, Greaves and Wallace (2014) are one step closer to an analysis based
solely on physical (gauge-invariant) concepts than are Brading and Brown (2004):
they take the representatives of the subsystem fields to be important, not the gauge
transformations themselves. I will now develop their view, and, in particular, will
parse the italicized text in their quote above.
4.2 Greaves andWallace: non-matching gauge transformations encode DES
To recapitulate: Greaves and Wallace (2014) claim the relational DES transfor-
mations are in 1-1 correspondence with the following quotient of two infinite-
dimensional groups:
GGWDES(ϕ)  G(s |∂ )/GId, (4.1)
where G(s |∂ ) are the gauge transformations of the region which preserve the state
ϕ at the boundary of the region, and GId are the gauge transformations of the region
which are the identity at the boundary.
Here is the gist of the argument (reflected in the above quote) leading from Defi-
nition 1 to Eq. 4.1 (and reflected in the above quote): certain gauge transformations
are not the identity at the boundary and yet they may keep particular boundary states
invariant. One can use such regional transformations to obtain a different universal
state, but the composition of the regional gauge transformations is not itself smooth
and therefore does not count as a gauge transformation relating the initial and final
universal configurations. Greaves and Wallace (2014)’s main mistake is that they
implement no criteria to establish whether the regional and universal states are indeed
physically distinct. As I will show below, this omission allows us to find a simple
counter-example, in which Eq. 4.1 is non-trivial and yet the transformations con-
structed above fail to yield physically distinct states, and thus do not satisfy condition
1 of Definition 1.
In more detail, let (A±, ψ±) be two configurations, one in each region ±,
that join smoothly, and such that ψ± = 0. Therefore we have the initial universal
configuration A = A+
+ + A−
−.
As a condition for these representatives to smoothly compose, we must have:
A+ |S = A− |S (where equality here includes equality of derivatives at S). But
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A+ |S has a stabilizer: at the Lie algebra level, this is g+ |S = c+ = 0 such that
grad(g+) |S = 0 and where c+ is some constant on S. Therefore, the configuration
Ã := Ag++ 
+ + A−
−





with g− = 0,36 is not a smooth (infinitesimal) gauge transformation (because g+
doesn’t vanish at S). (Greaves & Wallace, 2014) would conclude from this that Ã
is not a gauge-transformed A, and that, therefore, Ã and A are physically distinct.
Moreover, they observe, such a g+ corresponds to an element of Eq. 4.1 and essen-
tially, they claim, the same construction would apply for any other element of this
quotient group.
But without dealing with gauge-invariant quantities, Greaves and Wallace (2014)
have no warrant to conclude that Ã and A are physically distinct, and therefore no
warrant to conclude that condition 1 of Definition 1 is satisfied. In fact, it is only
true that Ã as it is written, doesn’t appear to be a gauge transformed A. But we can
explicitly construct a gauge transformation relating Ã and A as follows: Let g̃+ :=
g+ − c+. Now Ag̃++ = Ag++ (because the constant part has a trivial action on A+), and
so:








is a smooth gauge transformation (since g̃+ vanishes at S). And therefore Ã = Ag ,
so Ã is a gauge-transformed A after all! Thus [Ã] = [A]: that is, the physical,
gauge-invariant, states are identical and the transformation cannot have empirical
significance (condition 1 of Definition 1 fails). 37
(Although the above argument was formulated explicitly for electromagnetism, its
extension to the more general cases is straightforward.)
4.3 Greaves &Wallace’s and Brading & Brown’s errors
In my view, neither Greaves andWallace (2014) nor Brading and Brown (2004) could
have obtained the right characterization of DES, for Definition 2’s characterization
of DES in terms of physical i.e. gauge-invariant, states was not articulated by either
group. Indeed, they both explicitly endorse GSS. On this topic, Greaves and Wallace
(2014) write:
36 That is, Greaves and Wallace (2014) take g− ≡ 0: they take the environment gauge transformations to
be the identity, or to serve ‘as a reference’ for the gauge transformations of the subsystem, and the original
g+ to be the identity. This is a bit confusing, since stipulating the value of g does not usually fix a selective
class: given A, one cannot use this condition to assess whether A belongs to the selective class. Here, since
we are only interested in a counter-example to substantiate our criticism of their construal of DES, we will
ignore this point (which is not an issue for our formulation through ¬GSS).
37 If there was matter in the bulk, our counter-example would fail, because ψg̃++ = ψg++ . But the source of
such DES would be just what I described here through Theorem 1: namely, as required from the Theorem,
there is a stabilizer of the gauge potential but not of the matter field.
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GSS’: “Firstly, in doing so we make the assumption that knowing the state of
the subsystem and its environment suffices to specify the state of the total sys-
tem. [...] For example, it is true for Yang-Mills gauge theories in the connection
formalism but not in the holonomy formalism.” (p. 67)
This assumption, which I have labeled as an alternative statement of GSS, should
not be confused with its converse, which, all hands agree, holds for all of these
systems. Namely, the converse assumption—that the state of the whole, uniquely
determines the states of the subsystems—is not under dispute since the state of the
whole includes all relational information and more. But as we have stressed: given
just the intrinsic physical states of the subsystems, it is not necessarily the case that
there is just one way of putting them together; their conjunction may lack necessary
relational information.
The exception Greaves and Wallace (2014) make for the holonomy formalism
is telling here: how can physical significance depend on the choice of variables?
Indeed, for us it is immaterial: for electromagnetism, it is possible, using holonomies,
to recover precisely the same results as in Theorem 1. For Greaves and Wallace
(2014), it fails precisely because the holonomy formalism deals with gauge-invariant
observables.38
38Here I comment on the relation between ¬GSS and Myrvold’s ‘global patchy-non-separability’ (Myr-
vold, 2010, p.427), which they articulated for electromagnetism in holonomy variables (cf. footnote 5). In
electromagnetism, given the space of loops (smooth embeddings γ : S1 → ), one can form a basis of
gauge-invariant quantities by the holonomies, exp (i
∮
γ
A) (this can be accomplished more generally for
non-Abelian theories using Wilson loops, Barrett (1991)). For simply connected regions  like ours, by
composing regional loops γ± ∈ ± going in opposite directions at the boundary S it is true, as Myrvold
argues, that we recover the gauge-invariant holonomy corresponding to a larger loop γ not contained in
either region. Therefore any universal holonomy corresponds to a single doublet of regional holonomies.
According to Myrvold, separability fails only for non-simply connected manifolds, where the holonomies
of γ± cannot recover the universal holonomy of γ .
I have two comments to make on the relation to the present work: (i) In the absence of matter and in
the Abelian setting, non-trivial topology indeed is the only source of ¬GSS, and we recover Myrvold’s
conclusions. But with matter, we can close off curves which are not loops—which only change by gauge
transformations at their ends—by placing charges to cap off the curves, thereby obtaining gauge-invariant
holonomies (cf. (Gomes & Riello, 2019, Sec. 4.3.2)). These sourced holonomies correspond to the residual
variety we found for electromagnetism in Theorem 1, which occurs even for simply-connected  when
charged matter is present in the regions ±.
(ii) Unfortunately, Myrvold’s loop composition doesn’t work in the same way for the non-Abelian
theory: although the appropriate regional loops themselves will compose as curves in the manifold, Wil-
son loops—giving the gauge-invariant content of the holonomies—involve traces, and the traces ruin
the composition properties: the corresponding regional gauge-invariant quantities do not compose. Our
construction (see Appendix A.2) gets around that.
The conclusions, in Myrvold’s nomenclature, are then: global patchy separability fails for non-Abelian
theory if and only if: the manifold is non-simply connected, or charged matter is present inside the regions
and furthermore this charged matter obeys (perturbative) regional conservation laws (i.e. and the perturbed
gauge-field has stabilizers).
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4.4 How can a rigid subgroup have DES?
Now it is our turn to defend our construction from one of Greaves and Wallace
(2014)’s arguments, who judge it impossible that a ‘global’ (i.e. rigid) gauge trans-
formations, being a subset of the ‘local’ (i.e. malleable), may acquire DES, while
none of the malleable do.
As expressed in Eq. 4.1 for relational DES, (Greaves &Wallace, 2014) only claim
a group isomorphism between GGWDES, whatever it may be, and a quotient group, “empir-
ical symmetries correspond 1-1 [...] to elements of a quotient group” (p. 75).39 But
Greaves and Wallace (2014) do not see the quotient nature of their result as problem-
atic. In fact, they see it as exonerating their notion of relational DES from the charges
they make against the orthodox view on DES:
Nothing like the local/global distinction tells us which symmetries can in
general have empirical significance and, in particular, it is false that local
symmetries are in general unobservable. (p. 62)
(the italics are mine). That is, their accusation against the orthodox view is that it
attributes relational DES only to certain rigid subgroups of malleable groups.
Besides my criticisms of GSS’ (that is, that regional states should uniquely define
the universal state) and of the lack of a gauge-invariant criterion for DES, made in
Section 4.3, I have one more disagreement, with the quote from (Greaves & Wal-
lace, 2014, p. 62), reproduced just above. Contrary to what they affirm, it is precisely
the rigid/malleable distinction that tells us which symmetries can have empirical sig-
nificance. Indeed the rigid symmetries can only be meaningfully discerned from the
malleable contingently, when they have physical significance, according to my pro-
posal. Moreover, it is not false, but true, that malleable symmetries are in general
unobservable.40
And these conclusions hold, even if the group of rigid symmetries, when one can
be identified, is a subset of the malleable.
Admittedly: if one focuses just on the group itself, and not on its action on states,
one indeed cannot “pluck out” a rigid subgroup in any meaningful way. But contra
Greaves and Wallace (2014), it is entirely possible to associate DES only to cer-
tain physically meaningful rigid symmetries; the meaning is acquired through their
39The claim is based on intuitions for gauge theories in the asymptotic regime. But the situation in the
asymptotic regime, or for truncated configuration spaces, is more complicated: there, one does not consider
environment and subsystem to be on a par as we do for relational DES; the environment truncates the fields
and the gauge transformations at the boundary of the subsystem. In that case, we can obtain a group of
symmetries with DES that is isomorphic to the quotient and has no action on the subsystem states. These
results, obtained in Gomes (2020, Sec 4.2.2), largely recover those presented by Greaves and Wallace
(2014) (erroneously) for relational DES in Eq. 4.1, and more.
40I should clarify what ‘in general’ means here: for generic configurations of the non-Abelian theory,
and, in the Abelian case, for configurations in which there are charges in the bulk of a region, but not in
the boundary. In contrast, for Greaves and Wallace (2014), any configuration that lacks boundary charges
will attribute DES to all but a meager subset of the malleable symmetries. Namely, in their mathematical
treatment, the only malleable symmetries that lack DES are those that are the identity at the boundary.
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action on the fields. The transformations are the only ones that leave the gauge-
field, but not the matter fields, invariant.41 That means that in any background,
malleable transformations that don’t belong to these subgroups would lack DES.
That is, rigid symmetries may have DES in a given special background and yet lose
that significance for a generic background. Such subgroups are “plucked out” from
the surrounding malleable group by satisfying certain equations, e.g. the Killing
equations, which are themselves physically significant.
It is interesting here to pick up on the quote from page 62, regarding spacetime
translations. First, we must ask: what are the rigid translations and boosts in gen-
eral relativity, i.e. of a generic spacetime metric? Poincaré transformations are not
well-defined (i.e. geometrically defined) in a generic background metric. They are
defined by Killing fields for a Minkowski metric. In that sense, that subgroup is phys-
ically distinguished, but only in particular circumstances: it is only meaningful for a
Minkowski metric;42 in specific backgrounds (e.g. Minkowski), there will be a physi-
cally well-defined rigid subgroup of the malleable transformations, but this subgroup
will be effaced once one moves to generic backgrounds. One need not resort to quo-
tients to define this rigid subgroup, when the physical content of the theory will do it
for you.
Such subgroups of rigid symmetries are usually called stabilizers, and the config-
urations they stabilize are called reducible (cf. footnotes 16 and 20). And the same
concepts apply to gauge theories. In the Abelian case all A ∈ A are reducible, and
they all possess the same stabilizers, namely, the constant gauge transformation. The
non-Abelian case is much more similar to the spacetime case (see Appendix A.3
for a brief description): generic A are not reducible, but some are. Being reducible
is a physically significant fact: in the quotient space [A], the orbits of reducible
configurations are qualitatively different than the generic orbits.43
In sum, the translations may have significance, which show up only contingently
(in a Minkowski background), and which we deny to general diffeomorphisms. More
importantly, to characterize this significance we can talk about translations only,
without ever invoking general diffeomorphisms. That is, to talk about the physical
41Indeed, such special configurations are part of the structure of the physical quotient of the configuration
space of the theory by the gauge transformations, /G: the quotient is not a manifold, but a stratified
manifold, and the orbits whose fields are stabilized by subgroup of G are the ‘strata’.
42If one is thinking not in terms of active diffeomorphisms, but of coordinate transformations, then indeed,
one can single out translations and boosts, but only with respect to that coordinate system. More broadly,
there are generically no constant gauge-transformations: they usually require a global section to be defined.
One should also note that although for principal fiber bundles one has a natural action of the charge group,
G, this is not the case for associated bundles. One cannot define a “constant” action of the gauge group: it
can only be constant with respect to a given section (see Kobayashi and Nomizu (1963)).
43Note that the notion of reducibility covaries with the notion of stabilizers. Namely, if a configuration ϕ
is reducible, with a given stabilizer f ∈ G, then for any given g ∈ G, ϕg will also be stabilized by gfg−1.
This qualitative difference between the orbits renders the quotient space into a stratified manifold: i.e. a
space formed by a concatenation of boundaries (see Kondracki and Rogulski (1983) and Fischer (1970)
and, for a philosopher-friendly description of stabilizers, and their relation to conserved charges, (Gomes,
2019, Secs. 3.3.5-7))
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significance of rigid symmetries one need never invoke the larger malleable group in
which they can be embedded.
5 Conclusions
In this section we summarize in Section 5.3, but before that we gather two remaining
threads: the meaning of holism vis a vis the non-locality of gauge theories, discussed
in Section 5.1, and the epistemic role of subsystems, in Section 5.2.
5.1 Whence holism?
Gauge-invariant quantities are to some extent non-local (L9 in Earman’s classifica-
tory scheme (Earman, 1987)), which means there is in principle “room to explore”
between the whole and the sum of the parts. And it turns out that the known aspects
of non-locality in gauge theory, to a certain extent match the non-local aspects of
¬GSS.
One can see this is as follows. Gauss constraints are the defining characteristic of
gauge theories: they stipulate that charges couple to fields in such a way that their
conservation laws are dynamically respected. But Gauss’s law can clearly fluster
cluster decomposition: once one knows the electric flux around a closed surface, one
knows precisely the amount of charge within it. Quantities measured on the total-
ity of the boundary are therefore not independent of other quantities measured in the
bulk. Of course, this type of “synchronic non-locality” is not causal; it only repre-
sents “non-locally possessed” properties (in the language of Belot (1998) and Healey
(2007)). That is, there should be room for holism, which this paper has drawn on.
The work of Gomes and Riello (2019) reported here precisely delineates the sort of
non-locality involved. For generic regional states in Yang-Mills theory, one does not
have ¬GSS: in most circumstances we can describe the physical state of the whole
by describing the physical state of its composing regions. When the regional states
do not uniquely determine the universal state, ¬GSS ensues. In the Abelian case, this
¬GSS maps onto DES as I have defined it. That is, it is a particular non-locality that
is responsible for the gap between the regional gauge-invariant information and the
universal gauge-invariant information; it is this gap from which DES emerges.
In the non-Abelian case, a boundary can have stabilizers which are not shared by
the bulk of the regions. These will also result in ¬GSS, but, as argued in appendix
A, this variety cannot be associated with DES, as it has no unique representation as a
transformation of the regional states.
Moreover, as expected, the group of symmetries with DES has intimate connec-
tions with the charge group of the theory: For both Abelian and non-Abelian theories
the relevant residual variety of universal physical states can be parametrized by sub-
algebras of Lie(G). And these rigid symmetries with DES are in 1-1 correspondence
with the possible (covariantly) conserved charges in the region (cf. (Gomes & Riello,
2019, Sec. 4.3.2)). In the Galileo’s ship example, the variety is given by the action
of the Galilean group, ‘Boosts  Euclidean,’ on the subsystem, and the respective
charges are the conserved momenta.
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In a few words: for the physical, i.e. gauge-invariant, content of the gauge fields,
the whole can be more than the sum of the parts. Their difference manifests itself in a
direct empirical significance of (subgroups of) the charge group, and are in 1-1 rela-
tion to the conserved charges of the theory. The same can be said for Galileo’s ship
scenario, where the difference manifests itself in the direct empirical significance of
the Galilean group.
5.2 The role of the subsystem
The conclusion we have arrived at says that DES are not inextricable from other
effects of symmetries. In particular, I have related direct empirical significance (DES)
to a failure of supervenience on subsystems (¬GSS), and then stated that that sort
of ¬GSS is related to the indirect significance of symmetry (labeled IES), like
conservation of charges.
Given the sort of holism we have seen in ¬GSS, it thus might be conceptually
preferable to use global information about charges and other superselected quanti-
ties pertaining to IES to parametrize the possible gluings of regions in a gauge-free
manner. In that case, we may not want to invoke external sophistication.
Certainly in practice we will often lack the relevant global information, and so it
makes sense to use a local gauge-fixed parametrization to do calculations, make pre-
dictions, etc. Similarly, insofar as we only have a perturbative handle on the gluing
procedure in the non-Abelian case, and our current perturbation theory relies on com-
pactly localized fields, there is reason to use gauge-fixed compactly-localized fields
instead of gauge-invariant non-compactly localized fields, and external sophistication
gives a conceptual underpinning to the ensuing gluing procedures. But these sorts of
concerns are probably best seen as practical or technical barriers, not as in-principle
reasons to adopt external sophistication.
Indeed, from a global perspective external sophistication loses its warrant. But
then, so does the empirical relation between conserved charges and rigid symmetries,
since DES necessarily involves an external perspective.
5.3 Summary
Broadly speaking, in this paper I have explored the role of ¬GSS in the context
of gauge theories. I dissected the meaning and occurrence of “empirically signifi-
cant subsystem symmetries”, whose existence and characteristics are still matters of
debate in the philosophy of physics. To make matters concrete, I have focused on
Yang-Mills theory (and, in more detail, electromagnetism) and restricted subsystems
to be demarcated by spacetime regions.
In order to better adjudicate the debate between the opposing sides—represented
by Greaves and Wallace (2014) on one side, and Brading and Brown (2004) on the
other— it was first necessary to clear the ground by introducing new nomenclature.
The standard nomenclature of local and global gauge symmetries is perfectly ade-
quate if the system under study is the entire Universe, as is usually the case. But if
one wants to discuss subsystems, and needs to distinguish between symmetries acting
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also at these different levels, the standard nomenclature becomes awkward. The awk-
wardness is apparent when one refers, e.g.: to ‘a global subsystem symmetry’. The
new nomenclature uses four labels to express two logically independent distinctions:
namely (i) whether symmetries act only regionally or universally, and (ii) whether
they depend on an infinite or a finite set of parameters, i.e. whether they are rigid or
malleable when acting throughout a spacetime region or throughout the universe. It
also disentangles possible confusions with ‘non-local and local’ functions.
With these definitions in place, and in the specific setting of Yang-Mills theory
in bounded regions, I found myself in agreement with Greaves and Wallace (2014)
in their criticism of Brading and Brown (2004). Namely, Brading and Brown (2004)
prematurely dismissed the possibility of DES tranformations by assuming that such
a transformation would always create discontinuities in the boundary between the
regions. The difference between Greaves andWallace (2014) and Brading and Brown
(2004) can be briefly summarized thus: one should be concerned with smooth com-
position of regional gauge and matter fields (Greaves & Wallace, 2014), as opposed
to a smooth composition of gauge transformations (Brading & Brown, 2004), which
are not physical.
But the gluing of the gauge and matter fields is also not physical; only the com-
position of their gauge equivalence classes is. This misunderstanding is reflected in
Greaves and Wallace (2014)’s explicit assumption of supervenience on regions (cf.
GSS’ in Section 4.3), that is, that regional states should uniquely define the univer-
sal state. Greaves and Wallace (2014) admit this condition fails for gauge theories in
certain gauge-invariant bases (holonomies for the Abelian case), but it even clearly
fails for Galileo’s ship. Thus GSS seems inconsistent with an appropriate definition
of DES for gauge theories.
My interpretation of Greaves andWallace (2014) and Brading and Brown (2004)’s
oversight is that they forget aspects of the Definition 1 of DES: they do not check
whether condition 1 is satisfied explicitly (by employing gauge-invariance informa-
tion) and they do not consider condition 2 as involving physical information that is
intrinsic to a subsystem or region.
Having noticed these issues, we could summarize the journey from the present
results to Greaves and Wallace (2014) and from there to Brading and Brown (2004)
as follows: one should be concerned with the smooth composition of the physical
data, as given by gauge-equivalence classes, and not with smooth composition of
gauge and matter fields through given representatives (Greaves & Wallace, 2014),
and much less with the smooth composition of gauge transformations (Brading &
Brown, 2004).
With a clear course set, we were ready to provide a more precise definition of
DES. Finding the criteria for smooth composition of the information contained in
the equivalence classes [ϕ±] still presented a challenge. The challenge was: can their
physical content be composed into a universal physically valid state?
The way we got around the problem of gluing physical content was to use an
‘externally sophisticated view of symmetries’.44 Namely, I employed ‘reduction’,
44Such a view is intimately related to composition, as advocated by Rovelli (2014); see also Gomes (2019)
for the same issue in a context of regional subsystems.
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or better, ‘projection’, as a means to identify the regional and universal physical
contents—each non-locally determined within its corresponding domain,—and then
I employed sophistication for gluing.
We found that for electromagnetism as coupled to a scalar Klein-Gordon field—
when the Klein Gordon fields were taken to vanish at the boundary in between the
regions, but not in the bulk within them—there can be multiple universal physical
states formed by gluing the same regional physical states. That is, a failure of unique-
ness in the gluing creates the gap which gives a residual variety of universal physical
states. In other words, a variety of universal physical states can be built from the
same regional physical states. These regional and universal states fulfill our Defini-
tion 2 for ¬GSS, and thereby also correspond to purely relational DES, as described
in Definition 1.
Even though I have used ‘external sophistication’, Theorem 1, including its sig-
nificance for DES, is completely compatible with viewing gauge degrees of freedom
as “descriptive fluff”. The fact that the theory admits such a particular sort of redun-
dancy is related to the particular sort of non-locality of its gauge-independent degrees
of freedom.
In the landscape of the debate, we thus locate ourselves somewhere between the
two opposing views. On the side of Greaves and Wallace (2014), we find that gauge
theories may indeed harbor symmetries that have direct empirical significance. On
the side of Brading and Brown (2004) and the orthodoxy,45 we find that indeed
only rigid symmetries may have direct empirical significance in gauge theory. In
fact, surprisingly, the rigid ones correspond to ‘the global’ gauge transformations,
G (for non-Abelian: only for very particular perturbed configurations, that can carry
associated covariantly conserved charges). But to force my conclusion into either
pigeonhole, or even a combination, would be to shave off some of the important
subtleties of this situation.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Aldo Riello, my collaborator in all things gauge-related, for
many fruitful and insightful discussions and for co-developing the entire technical apparatus employed
in this analysis. And similarly, I would like to thank Jeremy Butterfield, for many discussions, for
many requests for clarification, for patiently guiding me in all things philosophy-related, and for giving
immensely valuable and thorough feedback on this paper.
Appendix A. Non-Abelian Yang-Mills
A. 1 Notation for Yang-Mills theory coupled tomatter
The general case works with a finite-dimensional charge group, e.g. G = SU(N),
with Lie algebra g := Lie(G), e.g. g = su(N). Given the charge group we define
the group of gauge transformations G = C∞(, G), with composition given by
pointwise action of G, i.e. (gg′)(x) := g(x)g′(x), and the respective infinitesimal
45In fact, in this point, we roughtly align with Kosso (2000)—but not always: only when covariantly
conserved charges exist—and not with Brown and Brading, who want to claim that even rigid internal
symmetries have no DES.
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version, Lie(G) = C∞(, g) (with pointwise Lie algebra commutator). An element
of G is a map: g(·) :   x → g(x) ∈ G. The gauge fields and its gauge-transformed
version Ag are given by Lie-algebra valued space(time) 1-forms.
We define, for a basis of 1-forms over  and τα a basis of the Lie algebra g
(A.1)
Infinitesimally, i.e. for an infinitesimal gauge-transformation ξ ∈ Lie(G), the gauge
field transforms as
A → A + Dξ where Dξ := ∂ξ + [A, ξ ]. (A.2)
For full generality we can introduce charged fermions in a fundamental representa-
tion: so for some vector space W , the 4-component Dirac spinor field (i.e. in C4)
as:
ψ ∈ C∞(,C4 ⊗ W) and ψg = gψ .
And I will write the joint configuration as
ϕ = (A, ψ)
I will denote the regional, unquotiented configuration spaces of each field sec-
tor (gauge field and matter, respectively) as A± = {A± ∈ 1(±,Lie(G))},
	± = {ψ± ∈ C∞(±,C4 ⊗ W)}. And, for the joint configuration spaces, I write
± = {ϕ± := (A±, ψ±) ∈ A± × 	±}, writing , 	,A. I will omit the subscript ±
for the corresponding universal configuration spaces. The restricted groups of gauge
transformations will be denoted in analogous fashion: G± = C∞(±, G), and all
abstract quotient spaces are denoted by the square brackets, as in [±] := ±/G±,
and [] := /G.
A.2 Gluing for non-Abelian Yang-Mills theory
In the non-Abelian case we have the equations analogous to Eq. 3.8 and Eq. 3.12,
namely: {
DiδA±i = 0
siδA±i |S = 0
(A.3)
DiδAi = 0 (A.4)
And we apply them to establish gluing, by first writing:
δA := (δA++Dξ+)
+ + (δA− + Dξ−)
−. (A.5)
We obtain the following conditions on ξ±:⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
D2ξ± = 0 on ±
siDi (ξ+ − ξ−) = 0 on S
(ξ+ − ξ−) |S = (D2S)−1(DcS(δA+c − δA−c )|S) on S
(subscript S means intrinsic to the surface).
   87 Page 36 of 41 European Journal for Philosophy of Science           (2021) 11:87 
We can solve these emerging conditions (see Section 4 in Gomes and Riello
(2019)), obtaining:







c − δA−c )|S
)
(A.6)
where, in each region, ζφ stands for a covariantly harmonic function, satisfying
D2ζ = 0, with Neumann boundary conditions at S given by siDiζ |S = φ, and where
the subscript S denotes “intrinsic to S”, and the intrinsic coordinates to S are given by
c, and whereR is the so-called Dirichlet-to-Neumman operator. Briefly,R functions
as follows: a given harmonic function with Dirichlet conditions—these conditions
are the input of R—will possess a certain normal derivative at the boundary; i.e.
will induce certain Neumann conditions there—these conditions are the output ofR.
That is, let ζ u be a harmonic function with Neumann boundary condition, then for ζu
a covariantly harmonic function with Dirichlet boundary condition, (ζu)|S = u, the
Dirichlet to Neumann operatorR is defined as ζu = ζR(u) (i.e. it finds the harmonic
function with Neumann condition corresponding to one with a Dirichlet condition).
In words here is what the theorem means. In a given region, say +, with respect
to the covariant differential operator D+, the vertical ξ+ which translates between the
global and regional horizontals, H|R+ = h++Dξ+, is defined as a harmonic function
with Neumann boundary conditions. The Neumann conditions are implicitly defined
by the difference of horizontals at the boundary, but since this difference would only
give a Dirichlet boundary condition, one must apply the Dirichlet to Neumann bound-
ary operator. Nonetheless, we can summarize: ξ± are the unique harmonic functions
with Neumann conditions defined by the difference of horizontals at the boundary.
Each such doublet will identify a unique global physical state compatible with the
doublet of horizontals, (h+, h−).
A.3 Non-Abelian¬GSS
There are two sources of under-determination of solutions to Eq. A.5: one topological
and one from homogeneous fields. The first arises from the possibly non-trivial first
(equivariant) homology group of , we look at the first in Section A.3.1 and at the
second in Section A.3.2.
A.3.1 Topological holism
We may have a universal field δA satifying Eq. A.4 which, when restricted to each
± is pure gauge, i.e. of the form Dξ±. In other words, the room for discrepancy
is equivalent to broken homology cycles. This is easier to see in the Abelian case,
where δA would be a one form which is exact in the simply connected patches,
but only closed in the entire manifold (see Gomes and Riello (2019), Section 4.7
for an example). By the Poincaré lemma, this occurs if and only if the topology
of the manifold is non-trivial. In other words, universal physical processes in this
case may not come from regional physical processes; some physical processes are
universal/global in nature.
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But of course for topologically non-trivial manifolds we should expect the whole
to contain more information than the sum of the parts, foiling GSS. The arising¬GSS
would contribute with the suitable homology group to the variety set I in Eq. 2.2.
Such a contribution has a finite number of generators (given by the first Betti number,
i.e. the rank of the first homology group).46
A.3.2 Stabilizer ambiguity
Barring non-trivial topology, is there another source of under-determination of ξ±
also in the non-Abelian case? To arrive at an answer, note that we are using the
gauge-fields as a reference. It is through them that we fix the ξ and parametrize the
reduced/quotient configuration space [] = /G. Therefore one source of ¬GSS
would be a possible under-determination of ξ±.
This under-determination occurs if and only if there exists a boundary transforma-
tion χS ∈ Lie(G)S such that
SDχS = 0 (A.7)
That is, if there exist boundary stabilizers.
In most cases these stabilizers need not be prolongated into the regions. However,
the special case in which χS = χ+ − χ− for regional stabilizers,
Dχ± = ∂χ± + [A±, χ±] = 0 (A.8)
for A = A+
+ + A−
− being the smooth field configuration around which we
are considering perturbations, we get DES in the sense of the main text. This is,
again, the “Killing” (or infinitesimal stabilizer) equation for gauge transformations.
Namely, under-determination of ξ± occurs if and only if there exist χS which stabilize
the boundary value of AS . The effect this ambiguity has on the ξ± is gauge-fixing




However, if χS = (χ+ − χ−)|S where χ± stabilize the entire A±, this ambiguity
becomes much simpler to express: we can use ξ± or ξ± + χ± for gluing. But in
this latter case, only if there is matter will the difference come with an effect in the
representation of the glued states. That is, the effect of a change ξ± → ξ± + χ±
is trivial without matter, since D±χ± = 0. Such stabilizers are generalizations of
the constant potential shifts in electromagnetism. Here the entire regional field must
be stabilized by χ±, and this singles out, from G±, the regional elements which can
potentially exhibit DES.
As with Killing directions for spacetime geometries, such elements are hard to
come by: they’re generically trivial (for non-Abelian charge groups G), and, when
non-trivial, they are generated by a finite-dimensional basis.
If the boundary stabilizers are inextendible to the regions, then each will corre-
spond with a different regional gauge-fixed configuration, and thus it will result in
46This topological fact should be consequential to the labeling of the inequivalent representations of the θ
vacua (see Strocchi (2015)).
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physical variety. But this difference is not attributed to a regional rigid symmetry and
thus cannot be associated with DES.
In sum: there may still be some small variety in ξ±, which is innocuous as far
as the gauge field is concerned, and some variety that is relevant. The former vari-
ety cannot be uniquely associated with a regional transformation, whereas, as we
will shortly see, the latter variety can be uniquely associated with a rigid regional
transformation with DES, but it can only be relationally felt by regional matter fields.
From now on we will ignore those transformation that only stabilize the boundary
values of the field, and focus on the ones that are intersting in the context of DES.
A.3.3 Obtaining variety from the regional stabilizer ambiguity
When we include matter fields, the universal field is composed as:
δψ = (δψ++ξ+ψ+)
+ + (δψ− + ξ−ψ) (A.9)
Since we are not using the matter fields to parametrize the quotient/moduli/reduced
configuration spaces, there are no analogues of equations (3.8) and (3.12) to be imple-
mented for it. But smoothness of the field does impose certain conditions. In fact,
different choices of stabilizer, adding χ+ = χ− to ξ+, ξ−, respectively, will render
the matter fields incompatible at the boundary.47
Therefore, if the matter fields do not vanish at the boundary, we can assume there
is again regional determinacy as per Definition 2. So we assume they vanish there;
a condition postulated by Greaves and Wallace (2014) as “dynamical isolation” of
the two regions. And also, if the matter field vanishes not only at the boundary, but
everywhere, no ¬GSS, i.e. GSS arises, yet again. Thus, I assume: the matter fields
vanish at the boundary, but not in the bulk of the regions.
To illustrate the precise emergence of the Lie algebra g, we resort to a ‘best-case’
scenario. That is, apart from the conditions stipulated above for the matter fields,
we will take the gauge field configuration around which we are perturbing to be the
‘vacuum’, A = 0. In that case, the gauge covariant differential just becomes the
standard differential (as in the Abelian, electromagnetic case), i.e. D → ∂ , and the
stabilizer equation becomes (∂χα(x))τα = 0. Then not only is the space of stabilizers
χ a finite-dimensional vector space, closed under commutation, but for this case it
forms a Lie algebra homomorphic to g.
Then we have a parametrized solution
δψ(χ+,χ−) = (δψ++(ξ++χ+)ψ+)
+ + (δψ− + (ξ− + χ−)ψ) (A.10)
But we are still not done. For χ+ = χ−, δψ is still universally gauge equivalent
to δψ(χ+,χ−), i.e. they differ by a universal, rigid gauge transformation. Therefore,
what really matters for universal variety is the difference: χ+ − χ−. This difference
47 That is, unless χ± also stabilize ψ±. For non-Abelian fields, there may still be internal stabilized
directions, i.e. for particular configurations ψ̃± = 0, there may be χ̃± = 0 such that χ̃±ψ± = 0. This is
not true for U(1), there χ̃±ψ± = 0 for any non-vanishing gauge transformation and matter field. But I do
not know of any non-trivial, shared stabilizers for both fields in such a situation.
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is generated by just one copy of g. That is, given the δA±, δψ±, we have:
(δA, δψ(i)) = (δA++Dξ+(i), δψ++ξ+(i)ψ+)
+ + (δA− + Dξ−, δψ− + ξ−ψ−)
−
(A.11)
where ξ+(i)(x) := (ξ+α (x) + iα)τα , for spacetime constant coefficients iα , with τα a
basis of g (which also implies Dξ+ = Dξ+(i)), i.e. the i parametrize the Lie algebra of
the charge group G.
Finally, we have arrived at our destination: I have shown that the variety set I ,
at least infinitesimally and in the best-case scenario, can in some sense recover the
charge group G, i.e. I have characterized the infinitesimal version of Eq. 3.3, with:
[δϕ(i)] = [δϕ+] ∪S(i) [δϕ−], i ∈ g, with [δϕ(i)] = [δϕ(i
′)] iff i = i′
(A.12)
For non-Abelian groups, it is not clear how to obtain the finite version of this
equation, replacing δϕ with ϕ, i.e. with
[ϕ(i)] = [ϕ+] ∪S(i) [ϕ−], i ∈ I  G (A.13)
But in the Abelian case, the tools utilized here do allow an integration to the finite
setting.48
Moving away from the best-case scenario of A = 0: to obtain ¬GSS the base con-
figuration A must still be somewhat homogenous; it must admit internal directions
which leave it unchanged. But as mentioned above, a general theorem about Killing
fields (and stabilizers), shows that Killing directions are always generated by a finite
dimensional basis; in the case of internal gauge transformations, this basis consists
of at most dim(g) elements, closed under commutation, etc. Thus even away from
the best-case, we obtain I ’s isomorphic to sub-algebras of g (we would also have
to replace τα in the definition of δψ(i) for a choice of basis {χα} of the appropriate
Killing, or stabilizing fields).
Note that, as had to be the case, according to Definition 2, there exists a regional
variety implicit in Eq. A.11, and this variety recovers also the definition of DES
through transformations, if the transformations referred to in Definition 1 are taken
to be e.g.: (δA, δψ) → (δA, δψ(i)).
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48This is related to the ‘dressing formalism”, see Section 9 of Gomes et al. (2019) and François (2019)
and Attard et al. (2018).
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